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The Broken Medicare Appeals System: 
Failed Regulatory Solutions and the 
Promise of Federal Litigation 
Greer Donley† 
Abstract 
The Medicare Appeals System is broken. For years, the System has been 
unable to accommodate a growing number of appeals. The result is a 
backlog so large that even if no new appeals were filed, it would take the 
System a decade or more to empty. Healthcare providers wait many years 
for their appeals to be heard before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and 
because the government recoups providers’ Medicare payments while they 
wait, the delays cause them serious financial harm. Even worse, providers 
are more likely than not to prevail before the ALJ, proving that the payment 
should never have been recouped in the first place. The financial pressure 
on providers creates widespread reverberations in the healthcare market, 
and consumers ultimately pay the price. Nevertheless, the government 
appears unwilling or unable to fix the problem. 
This Article explores how the System works, why the System broke, and 
what legal or legislative remedy could solve its problems. The Article 
articulates the central concern underlying the System’s backlog: small 
providers lack the liquidity and revenue stream to endure the uncertainty 
and delayed gratification that is now required to participate in the Medicare 
Program. As a result, these companies collapse or are purchased by larger 
providers—contributing to the consolidation of the healthcare market. An 
optimal remedy would relieve the pressure small providers face; it could be 
achieved by delaying the government’s ability to recoup Medicare 
payments before the provider has received an ALJ determination. Though 
legislative or administrative action could most easily accomplish this goal, 
providers have asked the judiciary to step in where the government is 
failing. Of the various legal challenges that providers have lodged against 
the government to protest the System’s delays, the one most likely to help 
small providers is under the Due Process Clause. This Article concludes that 
a due process challenge—though difficult to win—could have merit and 
might be small providers’ best chance of obtaining relief, at least in the 
short term. 
Contents 
 
†  As of August 1, 2018, Greer Donley will be an Assistant Professor at the University 
of Pittsburgh School of Law. She would like to thank Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Margo 
Schlanger, and Nicholson Price for their very helpful feedback on earlier drafts of 
this Article. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the 
Promise of Federal Litigation 
270 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 270 
I. Billing Medicare: How CMS Pays and Reviews Medicare Claims ....................... 272 
II. The Medicare Appeals System .......................................................................... 281 
A. Statutory Framework for Medicare Appeals ............................................... 281 
B. The System in Practice: Then and Now ....................................................... 283 
III. Impact of the System’s Delays on Consumers and the Broader Healthcare 
System ............................................................................................................. 287 
IV. Failed Regulatory and Legislative Solutions ...................................................... 293 
V. The Promise of Federal Litigation ...................................................................... 301 
A. Litigation Seeking to Force Compliance with the 90-Day Timeframe .......... 303 
B. Litigation Seeking to Delay Recoupment Until After the ALJ Hearing ......... 305 
1. Exploring the Merits of a Due Process Claim ........................................ 306 
a. The Severity of the Interest Affected ............................................. 308 
b. The Likelihood That an ALJ Hearing Would Improve Agency 
Decision Making ............................................................................ 310 
c. The Government’s Conflicting Interest ............................................. 311 
d. Early Victories Suggesting that a Procedural Due Process 
Challenge Could Be Successful ...................................................... 312 
2.  Legal and Practical Challenges Associated with a Due Process 
Challenge ............................................................................................. 313 
a. Jurisdiction ..................................................................................... 313 
b. Property Interest ............................................................................ 315 
c. Practical Implications ..................................................................... 317 
VI. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 317 
 
Introduction 
Over the past six years, the Medicare Appeals System (“System”), which 
handles appeals from Medicare payment determinations, has experienced 
extreme bureaucratic inefficiency. The problems began in 2010 when 
Congress implemented a new Medicare auditing program.1 This program 
dramatically increased the number of appeals entering the System, but did 
not expand the budget or modify the System’s structure to accommodate 
the influx.2 By the end of 2015, the Department of Health and Human 
 
1. See, Andrew Wachler and Jessica Forster, GAO Releases Report Outlining 
Continued Inefficiencies with the Medicare Appeals System and the Increasing 
Appeals Backlog, ABA, https://www.americanbar.o
rg/publications/aba_health_esource/2015-2016/august/appealsbacklog.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018) and CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &MEDICAID SERVS., RECOVERY 
AUDITING IN MEDICARE IN FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2015). 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data- and-Systems/Monitoring-
Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-
Program/Downloads/RAC-RTC-FY2014.pdf [hereinafter RECOVERY AUDITING]. 
2. RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-366, 
MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES REMAIN TO IMPROVE APPEALS PROCESS 19-20 
(2016) [hereinafter MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE]. 
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Services (“HHS”) admitted that the System was so backlogged that it could 
take eleven years for the System’s Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) to 
resolve the appeals pending before them, even assuming no new appeals 
were filed.3 
This backlog has caused enormous delays. Though Medicare providers 
are statutorily entitled to an ALJ determination within ninety days, the 
average provider waits at least three years.4 And as they wait, the 
government recoups providers’ money as if it has already won—often 
totaling millions of dollars per provider.5 This early recoupment would be 
justified by administrative efficiency if the underlying decisions were generally 
correct, but in reality, a significant proportion of these recoupments are 
erroneous and eventually returned.6 Delays associated with the backlog 
have hit small providers particularly hard.7 Many small providers face 
insolvency as they wait for an ALJ determination—a dynamic that 
exacerbates systemic healthcare problems for consumers. Most notably, it 
contributes to the consolidation of the healthcare market, which reduces 
competition and increases prices. 
Despite the government’s awareness of and attention to the situation, 
HHS8 has been unable to control the increasing number of appeals entering 
the System. The agency has requested additional funding from Congress for 
four years in a row, finalized a rule aimed at streamlining the System, and 
lobbied for legislative solutions.9 Nevertheless, Congress has failed to 
increase the budget or legislate reforms. And there is little evidence that 
the agency’s administrative reforms will impact the backlog in any 
significant way. 
Once it became clear that lobbying efforts were unlikely to be 
successful, both large and small Medicare providers took their complaints 
to the federal courts, pursuing different legal strategies that reflected their 
various needs. These efforts largely failed early on, but starting in late 2015, 
the courts became more receptive to these challenges. The litigation 
 
3. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PRIMER, 7, 
https://www.hhs.gov/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf (last visited Mar. 
26, 2018) [hereinafter HHS PRIMER]. 
4. MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE, supra note 2, at 1, 10,18. 
5. Id. at 2. 
6. Id. at 69. 
7. See Hirschfield, Marc E. & Skapof, Marc, Healthcare Providers Face Increasing 
Financial Pressure And Bankruptcy Risk, MONDAQ,(June 26, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/323360/Healthcare/H
ealthcare+Providers+Face+Increasing+Financial+Pressure+And+Bankruptcy+Risk. 
8. HHS is an umbrella agency that oversees many of the agencies at issue in this 
Article. 
9. MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE, supra note 2, at 38-39; Medicare Program: Changes to the 
Medicare Claims and Entitlement, 60 Fed. Reg. 4974 (Jan. 17, 2017). 
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surrounding the System’s delays presents an interesting case study on how 
the federal courts, though reluctant, can intervene when private parties, 
agencies, and Congress cannot solve administrative problems on their own. 
Unlike the legislature, however, the judiciary’s solutions are necessarily 
limited by the nature of the relief sought. One provider group, for instance, 
obtained a writ of mandamus, which ordered the government to empty the 
backlog and comply with the System’s statutory deadlines. But mandamus 
is an imperfect remedy: even if the writ reduces the backlog of appeals, it 
will do so at the expense of small providers and further perpetuate some of 
the problems associated with the System’s delays. A successful due process 
challenge, on the other hand, could create an optimal remedy by relieving 
the pressure small providers experience while waiting for an ALJ hearing. 
This Article explores how the System became so backlogged, why 
administrative solutions have failed, and what the best legal remedy could 
be. In Section I, I explain the process by which CMS or its contractors initially 
pay Medicare providers and subsequently identify and recoup overpayments. 
In Section II, I explore the System as Congress initially envisioned it, how it 
currently functions, and why it became so dysfunctional. Next, in Section III, 
I discuss how the delays associated with the System’s backlog play into 
problems that affect our healthcare market as a whole. Section IV then 
discusses the various regulatory and legislative proposals, explaining why 
these attempted solutions have failed, and how the agency or legislature 
could create meaningful change. 
Finally, in Section V, I explore two different kinds of legal challenges: 
mandamus and due process. The former aims to force compliance with the 
ninety-day statutory timeline, while the latter seeks to delay recoupment 
until after an ALJ hearing. Though only mandamus has been successful thus 
far, this Article argues a remedy in due process will provide more protection 
for small businesses, and consequently, consumers. While small providers 
have achieved some preliminary relief in their due process challenges, they 
all settled their cases with the agency before the merits were reached. This 
result is unsurprising given that small providers generally lack the financial 
capacity or incentive to litigate the issue to finality. This section concludes 
that a due process challenge has merit, and if small providers can overcome 
the obstacles inherent in litigating a due process claim, it may present their 
best chance at achieving the desired result absent legislative action. 
I. Billing Medicare: How CMS Pays and Reviews Medicare Claims 
The government provides health insurance for individuals over sixty-
five or who live with disabilities through the Medicare program.10 The 
 
10. An Overview of Medicare, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 2017), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-an-overview-of-medicare. 
Medicare beneficiaries can choose to enroll in either Medicare or Medicare 
Advantage (“MA”) health plans. Id. Private health insurers administer MA plans 
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government is the largest single healthcare payer in the United States, and 
as a result, it has a large and disproportionate influence on the healthcare 
market.11 Most healthcare providers and suppliers12 treat at least some 
Medicare patients,13 though certain providers do not generally service any 
Medicare enrollees (e.g. pediatricians) and others treat a 
disproportionately high number Medicare beneficiaries (e.g., hospice 
providers).14 Providers can also refuse to accept Medicare patients and, 
though it remains unusual, it is becoming more common for certain 
providers to do so.15 
After treating a Medicare patient, a provider submits a claim for payment 
to the government. If the government approves the claim, then the provider 
receives compensation.16 In this way, Medicare functions like any health 
insurer: it contracts with providers to treat its beneficiaries in exchange for 
 
and the government pays private insurers to cover beneficiaries on behalf of the 
government. Id. 
11. Tevi Troy, How the Government as a Payer Shapes the Health Care Marketplace, 
AM. HEALTH POL’Y INST, http://www.americanhea
lthpolicy.org/Content/documents/resources/Government_as_Payer_12012015.
pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
12. In this Article, I use the term provider to include both providers and suppliers. 
According to the statute: provider “means a hospital, critical access hospital, 
skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home 
health agency, hospice program, or, for purposes of section 1814(g) and 
section 1835(e), a fund.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (2010). The statute defines 
suppliers to “mean[], unless the context otherwise requires, a physician or 
other practitioner, a facility, or other entity (other than a provider of services) 
that furnishes items or services under this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(d) (2010). 
Healthcare “providers” include hospitals and other healthcare facilities, 
physicians’ groups, and product manufacturers to the extent their services or 
products are accepted for Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP reimbursement, see 
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (2006). 
13. Thomas Beaton, Providers Seeing Even Mix of Public, Commercially Insured 
Patients, HEALTH PAYER INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/providers-seeing-even-mix-of- public-
commercially-insured-patients. 
14. Greg Bengel, Doctors Refuse to Accept Medicare Patients, HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (Aug. 
9, 2013), https://www.healthitoutcomes.com/doc/doctors-refuse-to-accept- 
medicare-patients-0001. 
15. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OPTING OUT OF MEDICARE AND/OR ELECTING TO 
ORDER AND CERTIFY ITEMS AND SERVICES TO MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/SE1311.pdf; Melinda Beck, 
More Doctors Steer Clear of Medicare, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323971
204578626151017241898. 
16. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(a) (2010). 
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payment.17 CMS, however, does not function as the insurer itself; rather, it 
contracts with Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACs”) to perform 
various insurance functions on its behalf.18 For instance, MACs review 
providers’ claims for payment and pay providers for approved claims.19 
When a provider submits a claim for payment, MACs conduct a 
prepayment review to determine whether the claim meets Medicare’s 
conditions of payment.20 Contractors create a system that automatically 
pays certain claims, automatically denies certain claims, and tags other 
claims for additional review.21 Whether a claim is automatically paid or 
queued for further review is determined based on risk—i.e., contractors 
determine that certain claims are at a high risk for overbilling and are 
therefore reviewed more thoroughly before payment.22 The vast majority 
of claims are considered low-risk and may be paid automatically or semi-
automatically with little oversight.23 This assessment is called Non-Complex 
Review because it does not evaluate the medical documentation 
supporting the claim, but rather confirms certain conditions of payment are 
met by computer systems or non-expert coders.24 Such claims can be 
automatically denied, for instance, if the provider submits the claim with 
missing, or clearly incorrect information.25 Factors such as device delivery 
dates and length of stay requirements can also form a more substantive 
basis to quickly reject or accept the claim.26 
 
17. See What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-
plans/decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
18. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare- Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/MCRP_Booklet.pdf (last updated Sept. 2016) 
[hereinafter MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS]. 
19. What is a MAC, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/Medicare-Admi
nistrative-Contractors/What-is-a- MAC.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
20. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, §3.2, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Guidance/Manuals/downloads/pim83c03.pdf (last updated Nov. 9, 2017) 
[hereinafter MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL]. 
21. Id. at §3.2.B.  
22. Id., at §3.2.1. 
23. See e.g., Gulfcoast Med. Supply v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Case 
No. 8:04-CV-2610-T-26EAJ, 2005 WL 3934860 *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2005) 
(citations omitted), aff’d 468 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[I]nitial payment for 
services under Medicare is ordinarily made as long as the [Medicare] claim does 
not contain glaring irregularities on its face.”). 
24. See MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 18. 
25. Id. at § 3.2.A. 
26. Id. at § 3.2.1.2. 
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A small number of flagged claims, however, are reviewed under 
Complex Review prior to payment; this involves a medical professional or 
claims analyst analyzing the claim to ensure it is “for a service or device that is 
medically reasonable and necessary.”27 Complex Review is not rote; it involves 
an assessment of the claim’s medical documentation—such as physician 
notes, medical charts, and diagnosis codes—by an expert reviewer.28 
Contractors reviewing these claims may request additional documentation 
before approving or denying them.29 Complex Review is time consuming 
and expensive; contractors cannot use it to review every claim before 
payment. Instead, contractors “target their efforts at error prevention to 
those services and items that pose the greatest financial risk to the 
Medicare program and that represent the best investment of resources.”30 
Contractors flag claims as high risk—and therefore conduct Complex 
Review—for many reasons. For instance, the claim may be expensive, 
frequently billed, or use a diagnosis or procedure code with a history of 
incorrect billing.31 Tracking claims in this way allows contractors to review 
a small number of the riskiest claims in depth while still paying providers 
quickly for the majority of their services.32 
The result of prepayment review—whether Non-Complex or 
Complex—is called the Initial Determination.33 If the Initial Determination 
approves a claim, the provider is paid according to a price outlined by 
federal law and regulations.34 If the Initial Determination denies a claim, the 
provider is not paid, but can resubmit it or challenge the denial through the 
System.35 Though the Initial Determination forms the basis of payment, it is 
only the beginning of the government’s review. Following payment—often 
many years later—different kinds of Medicare contractors or government 
agencies can review claims again through post-payment audits.36 
 
27. Id. at § 3.2.1.1. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at § 3.2.1. 
33. MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 20. 
34. See e.g., MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 20; see e.g., MEDICARE 
INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20. 
35. See infra Section II. 
36. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 52. For an examination of the 
different kinds of Medicare contractors, see Don Romano & Jennifer 
Colagiovanni, The Alphabet Soup of Medicare and Medicaid Contractors, 27 
HEALTH L. 6, 1 (2015). Some of the most extensive post-payment reviews are 
conducted by the Medical Review Program, the Comprehensive Error Rate 
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Post-payment review is typically Complex, involving a deep dive into 
the medical documentation to determine whether each claim meets 
Medicare requirements.37 Errors generally result from insufficient medical 
documentation to support the intervention, medical documentation that 
supports a different code than was billed, or lack of medical necessity in the 
documentation submitted.38 Like prepayment reviews, these post-payment 
audits usually involve a review of certain high-risk claims as opposed to the 
provider’s entire claim history. Because audits can occur up to three years 
after payment, the government can target its reviews based on data from 
an earlier payment year.39 For example, in 2012, the government could 
retrospectively analyze the 2010 payment data, find a suspicious uptick of 
the billing for a certain procedure code, and then in 2013, conduct wide-
ranging audits of providers’ use of that code in 2010.40 When a post-
payment auditor decides that the claim should never have been paid, the 
government will issue an overpayment determination, which requires the 
provider to repay the funds.41 
Post-payment review is a vital part of protecting the Medicare trust 
funds.42 Because MACs cannot review every claim before payment, post-
payment review allows the government to retrospectively identify 
incorrectly paid claims.43 Returning these overpayments to the government 
helps to ensure the sustainability of the Medicare program.44 For instance, 
in 2016, roughly eleven percent of Medicare claims were improper, 
corresponding to roughly $41.1 billion in overpayments.45 Without post-
 
Testing Program, the Recovery Audit Program, and the Office of the Inspector 
General. MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 18. 
37. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20. 
38. MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19. 
39. RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1. 
40. MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19, at 8-9. 
41. MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19. 
42. Medicare is paid for by two trust funds, which are supported through taxes and 
premiums. See generally How is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, 
https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-medicare-is-funded/medicare-
funding.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
43. MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19. 
44. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Accidental Administrative Law of the Medicare 
Program, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 1, 130-32 (2015). Because Medicare 
developed into a procurement program, the government developed mechanisms 
to help it combat the inevitable fraud that developed. Id. 
45. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 2016 IMPROPER 
PAYMENTS REPORT, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-
Programs/CERT/Downloads/MedicareFeeforService
2016ImproperPaymentsReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
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payment review, that money would not have been returned to the 
government. Post-payment audits can also help the government identify 
fraud, or the intentional submission of false Medicare claims.46 It is 
important to remember, however, that overpayments are separate and 
distinct from fraud. Fraud indicates that the provider knowingly deceived 
the government, whereas an overpayment is the result of the provider’s 
genuine mistake.47 Even though the government’s ability to conduct post-
payment review is vital, in recent years, the nature of post-payment audits 
has shifted in two fundamental ways that raise questions about the 
integrity of post-payment audits. 
First, post-payment auditors have increasingly chosen to use 
extrapolation in their reviews. Extrapolation allows auditors to review a 
small sample of claims and then apply the findings to the provider’s entire 
set of claims for that particular fiscal year (“FY”).48 For example, assume 
that a provider submitted—and received payment for—one thousand 
inpatient hospital claims.49 Assume further that the government decided to 
audit these claims. If a post-payment auditor reviewed only twenty of them, 
concluding that five of the twenty should not have been paid,50 then the 
provider must repay the government twenty-five percent of the payments 
it received for all one thousand inpatient claims. In other words, the 
reviewer will deem 250 claims as overpaid even though it only found five 
claims deficient. 
 
46. The False Claims Act, for instance, requires the government to prove that a 
provider knowingly submitted a false claim for payment. A person acts knowingly 
under the Act if s/he “(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in 
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in 
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) 
(2010). 
47. Medicare Overpayments, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/overpaymentbrochure508-09.pdf [hereinafter 
MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS]. 
48. See Chaves County Home Health Servs. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991); 
OIG Extrapolation in Medicare Compliance Review Triples Hospital’s 
Overpayment, 22 REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE 20 (June 3, 2013). 
49. This example was chosen intentionally. RACs have focused a great deal of 
attention on inpatient claims. Hospitals are paid more for inpatient claims than 
observation claims. If a RAC concludes that a hospital should have observed a 
patient rather than admitted the patient, then the whole claim is deemed an 
overpayment, even though the hospital would have been eligible for a portion of 
that payment had it initially billed the government for observation. This surprising 
result has been challenged unsuccessfully in federal court. Bagnall v. Sebelius, No. 
3:11CV1703, 2013 WL 5346659 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2013). 
50. For instance, the review could determine that the patients should not have been 
admitted, but rather kept in observation, which the government reimburses at a 
lower rate to the hospital. See discussion in supra notes 52. 
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This tactic allows the government to commit fewer resources to its 
audits while at the same time recouping more money.51 Providers, 
however, can face enormous financial consequence as a result of these 
extrapolated audits.52 Providers have sued on this issue, claiming that the 
government should not use extrapolation, or at the very least, should be 
required to use the most accurate statistical modeling.53 Courts have not 
been persuaded. Instead, courts have deferred to the agency to dictate the 
procedures of their audits.54 The use of extrapolation itself is less 
concerning than the fact that the agency is not held accountable to the 
statistical methods it utilizes, even if it adopts second-tier methods with big 
financial impact.55 
Second, Congress created the Recovery Audit Program (“RAP”), 
implemented in 2010, which generated a new type of post-payment audit 
and increased the number of post-payment reviews.56 The RAP designated 
Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”) to conduct RAP audits.57 By statute, 
RACs are paid on a contingency fee—i.e., they collect a portion of the 
 
51. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE 
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016, (Jan. 2017), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY2016-hcfac.pdf 
52. See e.g., Am. Health Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“This problem 
takes a particular toll on hospitals with a large share of patients who rely on 
Medicare”); Press Release, Am. Orthotic Prosthetic Ass’n, Study: Medicare Audit 
“Mess” Surging At Rate Of 15,000 New Appeals Per Week, Agency Could Avoid 
Rapidly Mounting Interest Payments, (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.aopanet.org/2015/03/study-medicare-audit-mess-surging-at-rate-
of-15000-new-appeals-per-week-agency-could-avoid-rapidly-mounting-interest-
payments/[hereinafter Press Release]. 
53. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20. 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (2010) (authorizes Medicare contractors to use 
extrapolation to determine overpayment amounts when the Secretary 
determines that, “there is a sustained or high level of payment error or 
documented educational intervention has failed to correct the payment error.” 
Once this threshold finding is made, the provider has no means of challenging it.) 
Gentiva Healthcare v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 292, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
55. Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful at challenging the validity of the sampling and 
extrapolation method—courts have held that CMS or its contractor need not 
undertake the most precise sampling methodology so long as the method used is 
statistically valid. In the Case of Michael King, No. M.-10-321, 2011 WL 6960267, 
at *10 (May 10, 2011); Martin v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 114 F.Supp.3d 
549, 572 (E.D. TN 2014); Pruchniewski v. Leavitt, No. 8:04-CV-2200-T-23TBM, 2006 
WL 2331071, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2006). 
56. Facts About The Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013, AM. HOSP. ASS’N, 2 
(2014), http://www.aha.org/content/13/fs-hr1250rac.pdf [hereinafter AM. 
HOSPITAL ASS’N ]. 
57. Kinney, supra note 47, at 130-32. 
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overpayments they identify.58 CMS currently pays RACs between nine and 
twelve and a half percent of the overpayments they identify, based on a 
competitive bidding process.59 However, for certain kinds of audits, CMS 
has increased that percentage to seventeen and a half percent.60 
This incentive structure has caused providers alarm, and many see RACs 
as “bounty hunters” looking for overpayments at the expense of physicians 
and hospitals.61 Members of Congress have similarly expressed discomfort 
with the financial incentives imbedded within the RAP. In a letter to the 
Secretary of HHS, these Congressmen stated: “due to this payment 
structure, RACs are incentivized to deny claims, even when the claims are 
correct.”62 Moreover, the time and expense providers must incur in hosting 
auditors and gathering medical documentation further antagonizes the 
relationship between RACs and providers.63 Expenses associated with RAC 
audits and appeals can exceed $100,000 per audit for many hospitals.64 
Nevertheless, the RAP has been very successful for CMS: in 2014, RACs 
identified $2.39 billion in overpayments.65 But RAC audits also dramatically 
increased the number of “overpaid” claims that are later overturned 
through the Medicare Appeals System.66 According to the American 
Hospital Association (“AHA”), RACs deem nearly half of the claims they 
review to be invalid overpayments. Of the RAC determinations that are 
 
58. Id. (“RACs are paid by CMS on a ‘contingency fee’ basis, which means they are paid 
a commission on each claim that they deny. RACs are currently reimbursed 9-12.5 
percent of the Medicare payments they deny.”); Hospital Survey Report: The Real 
Cost of the Inefficient Medicare RAC Program, AM. HOSP. ASS’N., 2 (2015), 
http://www.aha.org/content/15/hospsurveyreport.pdf [hereinafter Hospital 
Survey Report]. 
59. Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,044 (Nov. 
10, 2010). 
60. Medicaid Program; Announcement of Medicaid Recovery Audit Contractors 
(RACs) Contingency Fee Update, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,127, 11,127 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
61. AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, supra note 57 (“Hospitals Need a Level Playing Field with RAC 
Bounty Hunters”); AM. MED. ASS’N, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION FACT SHEET MEDICARE 
RECOVERY AUDI CONTRACTOR (RAC) PROGRAM APPEALS, 
https://resourcesforrisk.com/_defa
ult/download/download_free_doc.php?file=Recovery+Audit+Contracto 
rs+Fact+Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) (“The AMA remains deeply opposed 
to utilization of contingencies for RACs since it is a bounty hunter-like program 
that creates a financial incentive for RACs to identify overpayments.”). 
62. Letter from Members of Congress, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Department 
of Health and Human Services (Feb. 10, 2014) available at: 
http://www.aha.org/content/14/140210-let-congress-hhs.pdf. 
63. Hospital Survey Report, supra note 58, at 3-4. 
64. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 57. 
65. RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1, at 13. 
66. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 57. 
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appealed, some estimate that more than seventy percent are overturned 
on appeal.67 Because of the high reversal percentage and the contingency 
fees paid to contractors, only $1.6 billion of the $2.39 billion in RAC-
identified overpayments were returned to the Medicare trust fund in 
2014.68 Fortunately, when a RAC’s overpayment determination is 
overturned, RACs must repay the contingency fee.69 
The nature of Complex post-payment review makes bias particularly 
problematic. One of the most subjective conditions of payment that 
contractors review is medical necessity.70 Medical necessity review involves 
a complex, fact-based assessment, where Medicare contractors—looking 
for flaws—can scrutinize medical documentation with the benefit of 
hindsight to identify services they deem medically unnecessary.71 The 
reviewer can second-guess the medical judgment of the doctor even if she 
is not a physician herself or in the same specialty as the original physician.72 
Other requirements are equally frustrating for providers. For instance, 
providers may need to wait a certain number of months from the patient’s 
initial complaint before ordering certain interventions, see a patient face-
to-face, or record specific facts about the patient in the medical chart to 
justify ordering a test or procedure.73 The list is extensive and many of these 
regulations are technical and constantly changing.74 
In Caring Hearts Personal Home Services v. Burwell, the Tenth Circuit 
questioned the complexity and number of CMS regulations.75 The court 
wondered whether Medicare laws have become so byzantine that the 
agency has lost control of them.76 In this case, the plaintiff challenged a 
Medicare appeals determination within the Medicare Appeals System.77 The 
 
67. Id. at 5; Lisa A. Eramo, RAC Appeals: Should You Bother?, 25 FOR THE RECORD 10, 14, 
(July 2013), http://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/0713p14.shtml. 
68. RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1. 
69. Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,039 (Nov. 
10, 2010). 
70. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 27-28. 
71. Id. at 65. 
72. AM. AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, supra note 57 (“Despite protests by the AMA that RAC 
audits involving complex medical reviews be performed by a physician of the same 
specialty and the same of the physician under review” RACs will use “nurses, 
therapists, and certified coders to review claims.”). 
73. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 34. 
74. See CMS, ICD-10-CM OFFICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CODING AND REPORTING FY 2018, 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/ICD10/Downloads/2018-ICD-10-CM-
Coding-Guidelines.pdf (last visited March 24, 2018). 
75. Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968, 976-77 (10th Cir. 2016). 
76. Id. 
77. See id. 
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provider argued that regulations it allegedly failed to meet were not in effect 
when the claims at issue were submitted; instead, it claimed, the reviewer 
erroneously applied regulations implemented in 2013 to 2010 claims.78 The 
court agreed and chastised the agency and the four arbiters in the System 
for failing to keep track of the rules it promulgated: 
 
This case has taken us to a strange world where the government itself—
the very “expert” agency responsible for promulgating the “law” no 
less—seems unable to keep pace with its own frenetic lawmaking. A 
world Madison worried about long ago, a world in which the laws are “so 
voluminous they cannot be read” and constitutional norms of due 
process, fair notice, and even the separation of powers seem very much 
at stake. But whatever else one might say about our visit to this place, 
one thing seems to us certain: an agency decision that loses track of its 
own controlling regulations and applies the wrong rules in order to 
penalize private citizens can never stand.79 
 
This case highlights the expanding regulatory burden that Medicare 
providers face. Providers must keep track of the government’s voluminous 
and expanding regulations to defend their right to compensation for the 
services they provide. The government can review their claims 
retrospectively using post-payment auditors that have known conflicts of 
interest. And with extrapolation, a mistake on one claim can cost providers 
millions of dollars, even if the physician provided the services in good faith. 
These flaws do not call for an elimination of post-payment audits, but 
underscore the paramount need for fair appeals with sufficient procedural 
protections to mitigate any risk of abuse. As explored below, it is not clear 
that providers are sufficiently protected by the System as it functions today. 
II. The Medicare Appeals System 
A. Statutory Framework for Medicare Appeals 
The process for appealing a Medicare overpayment determination 
involves four steps: Redetermination, Reconsideration, ALJ hearing, and 
Department of Appeals Board (“DAB”) Review.80 MACs and Qualified 
Independent Contractors (“QICs”), which are both Medicare contractors 
paid by CMS, render the first two levels of review (Redetermination and 
 
78. Id. at 970 
79. Id. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2010); see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PARTS 
A & B. APPEALS PROCESS, 3, https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-
Education/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLN
Products/downloads/MedicareAppealsprocess.pdf (last updated June 2017) 
[hereinafter MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM]. 
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Reconsideration respectively).81 By contrast, the Office of Medicare 
Hearings and Appeals (“OMHA”), which employs the ALJs and DAB 
members, is located outside CMS and is therefore more independent from 
the agency.82 These four steps of appeal constitute the Medicare Appeals 
System, and only after a provider proceeds through them can they 
challenge the overpayment determination in federal court.83 
CMS’s recoupment authority is tied to the System. After CMS conducts a 
post-payment review and renders an overpayment determination, the 
government issues a demand letter.84 The letter gives the provider thirty days 
upon receipt to lodge an appeal against some, or all, of the post-payment 
review results.85 Post-payment audit results that are not challenged within 
thirty days are subject to immediate recoupment.86 If a provider challenges 
the audit, however, the appeal enters the System, and the government 
cannot recoup those payments until after Reconsideration and 
Redetermination.87 CMS may, however, recoup overpayments before the 
ALJ determination, even if the Reconsideration decision is being appealed 
to the ALJ.88 Recoupment allows the government to either demand 
repayment or to withhold future payments from providers to compensate 
the debt.89 
The statute creating the System requires completion of each step in the 
appeals process within a certain timeframe. Redetermination and 
Reconsideration must be completed within sixty days of the provider’s 
request for the corresponding level of appeal.90 An ALJ must render a 
determination within ninety days of the provider’s initial request for 
review.91 Within this timeframe, the ALJ must conduct and conclude its 
 
81. MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 80, at 6-7; MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra 
note 20, at 4. 
82. OMHA is housed under HHS, but not under CMS. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3. 
83. Statutes prohibit parties from challenging an appeal in court before completing all 
four steps in the administrative appeals process. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2010). 
84. MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47. 
85. Id. 
86. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., LIMITATION ON RECOUPMENT (935) FOR PROVIDER, 
PHYSICIANS AND SUPPLIERS OVERPAYMENTS (Sept. 29, 2008), 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network- 
MLN/MLNMattersArticles/Downloads/MM6183.pdf [hereinafter LIMITATION ON 
RECOUPMENT]. 
87. Id.; MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47. 
88. Id. 
89. MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47. 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(3)(C) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C) (2010); see MEDICARE 
APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 84. 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2010). 
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hearing and render a decision.92 The fourth step—DAB review—must also 
be completed within ninety days of the provider’s request for it.93 As 
explored below, these timelines have become meaningless and the System 
no longer functions as it was designed. 
 
 Name Arbiter Deadline 
Post-Payment Review Finds an Overpayment, and the Provider Wants 
to Appeal 
 Step One Redetermination MAC (under CMS) 60 days 
Step Two Reconsideration QIC (under CMS) 60 days 
CMS May Begin Recoupment within 30 Days of the Reconsideration 
Decision 
Step Three Determination by ALJ ALJ (under OMHA) 90 days 
Step Four Determination by DAB DAB (under OMHA) 90 days 
Provider May Challenge the Overpayment in Federal Court 
 
B. The System in Practice: Then and Now 
Until 2010, the System largely functioned according to the statutory 
deadlines.94 Prior to 2010, processing the ALJ hearing and determination 
took an average of ninety-five days.95 When providers receive timely 
decisions, the financial burden associated with erroneous recoupment is 
less significant because the government reimburses the provider quickly—
i.e., the provider is not deprived access to its funds for long.96 Further, when 
 
92. Id. 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(2)(A) (2010). 
94. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-366, MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE: OPPORTUNITIES 
REMAIN TO IMPROVE APPEALS PROCESS 69 (2016), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677034.pdf [hereinafter GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE]; 
Adjudication Timeframes, Dep’t Health & Human Services., Office of Medicare 
Hearings & Appeals (last updated Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/impor
tant_notice_regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html [hereinafter 
Adjudication Timeframes]. 
95. See Adjudication Timeframes, supra note 94. 
96. When the hearing and determination occurs as the statute requires, then an 
erroneous denial would deny providers funds for a maximum of five months: 
providers have 60 days to lodge their appeal and ALJs have 90 days to render a 
decision. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2010). In practice, this is much shorter given 
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the System functions according to the statutory timeline, it properly 
balances the government’s interest in collecting valid overpayments against 
providers’ harm in having their payments erroneously recouped. 
When CMS implemented the RAP in 2010, it caused a dramatic increase 
in appeals entering the System, clogging it up. There are two reasons that 
the RAP caused an influx of appeals: first, there were simply more post-
payment audits for providers to challenge, and second, providers were 
more likely to challenge RAC findings because they were suspicious of RACs’ 
financial incentives.97 When Congress created the RAP, it did not expand 
OMHA’s budget to accommodate the predictable increase in appeals,98 and 
as a result, providers blame this program for the System’s ballooning 
delays.99 CMS concedes that this program has significantly contributed to 
the increase in appeals, but also points to other factors that have played a 
role—such as the aging of the baby boomers, which increased the number 
of Medicare beneficiaries (and therefore the number of claims CMS needs 
to review, which can be appealed).100 
Providers are particularly troubled by the delays associated with step 
three of the System, where they receive an ALJ hearing. Between 2009 and 
2014, “the number of requests for an ALJ hearing or review increased 
1,222%,”101 but the budget for OMHA, the office responsible for Medicare’s 
ALJ appeals, increased by only sixteen percent from 2010 to 2014.102 By 
the end of 2015, OMHA received “more than a year’s worth of appeals 
every eighteen weeks.”103 Assuming it received no new appeals, it would 
take OMHA eleven years to work through the backlog of appeals.104 And the 
“backlog shows no signs of abating as the number of incoming appeals 
continues to surpass the adjudication capacity at Levels 3 and 4.”105 As of 
 
that recoupment often does not start immediately, see 42 U.S.C. 
§1395fff(a)(3)(C)(ii) and § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2010). 
97. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 57, at 2; see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, 
at 15. 
98. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 15. 
99. Christopher Cheney, RAC Reforms Leave Providers Skeptical, MEDPAGE TODAY (Jan. 
19, 2015), https://www.medpagetoday.com/public
healthpolicy/medicare/49612. 
100. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3. 
101. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement, Medicare 
Advantage Organization Determination, and Medicare Prescription Drug 
Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures, 81 Fed. Reg. 43,790, 43,792 (July 5, 
2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 401, 405, 422). 
102. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 20. 
103. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 7. 
104. Id. at 3. 
105. Id. at 41, at 7; OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS & APPEALS, JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES 
FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE – FISCAL YEAR 2016 6 (2015). 
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September 1, 2017, nearly 600,000 appeals are pending at OMHA106 and 
OMHA only has capacity to hear 77,000 appeals per year.107 By 2021, the 
government expects that there will be nearly one million pending appeals 
before OMHA, even taking into account all of the agency’s efforts to reduce 
the backlog.108 OMHA currently resolves appeals within an average of three 
years109—already eleven times longer than permitted—but “some already-
filed claims could take a decade or more to resolve.”110 
Despite this enormous wait to receive an ALJ hearing, providers find ALJ 
review to be the most important of the System’s four steps. According to 
the Government Accountability Office, providers succeed at overturning 
challenged denials more than half of the time.111 In 2014, for instance, ALJs 
fully reversed overpayment determinations in fifty-four percent of 
appeals.112 In previous years, ALJ reversal rates were over sixty percent.113 
And certain providers are historically even more successful before ALJ.114 
Two factors, explored in more depth below, explain the high reversal rate: 
ALJ review is the first time providers (1) receive an evidentiary hearing and 
(2) are heard before truly neutral arbiter. 
Even though an ALJ is more likely than not to find that an alleged 
overpayment was valid, CMS still recoups and withholds those payments 
from providers while they wait years for an ALJ hearing.115 Though the 
government must repay the erroneously recouped payment if the provider 
 
106. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. 
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58. 
107. Medicare Program Changes, 81 Fed. Reg. at 43, 792. 
108. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. 
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58. 
109. Workload Information and Statistics—Average Processing Time by Fiscal Year, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (May 24, 2017), 
www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/omha/about/current-workload/average-
processing-time-by-fiscal-year/index.html; see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 
F.3d. at 171 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Henderson, J. dissenting). 
110. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 867 F.3d at 163; see also Am. Health Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 
183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“These figures suggest that at current rates, some 
already-filed claims could take a decade or more to resolve.”); see also MEDICARE 
OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47. 
111. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 20. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 69. 
114. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
American Hospital Association[] reported that they had appealed 52% of RAC 
denials, and that 66% of these appeals were successful.”). 
115. Press Release, supra note 52. 
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prevails, this is of little benefit to providers whose businesses cannot 
survive the years-long wait.116 
Small healthcare providers, which have less liquidity and tolerance for 
missing revenue, have been the most notable victims of this process.117 The 
American Orthotic Prosthetic Association has stated that “small health care 
providers like orthotic and prosthetic firms have been ‘unable to deal with 
being bombarded by the uncertainty resulting from long-delayed [RAC] 
appeals for disputed Medicare payments.’”118 The Association highlighted 
that the pressure from the appeals backlog have forced over one hundred 
small health care businesses “to close their doors” and that “many more 
are in danger of being shuttered.”119 Larger providers, like hospital chains, 
can weather these delays and do not face the same threat.120 But regardless 
of their size, all providers argue that the System’s delays harm patients 
because their money is tied up in appeals when it could be used for patient 
care.121 
The statute offers providers one recourse for the delays: escalation. 
Escalation allows providers to proceed to the next stage of the appeal when 
the agency exceeded its deadline in the previous stage.122 So if it takes 
longer than ninety days to receive an ALJ hearing, providers are statutorily 
entitled to skip the ALJ hearing and move to DAB review.123 This remedy, 
however, requires a big sacrifice. First, the DAB is only required to provide 
an evidentiary hearing if an “extraordinary question” is at issue; therefore, 
escalating beyond an ALJ requires most providers to forfeit their only 
 
116. Press Release, supra note 52. 
117. Press Release, supra note 52; Jessica L. Gustafson and Abby Pendleton, Medicare 
Appeals Adjudication Delays: Implications For Healthcare Providers And Suppliers, 
26 No. 5 HEALTH L.. 26, 28 (2014) [hereinafter Gustafson and Pendleton] (“Of 
particular importance, the delay in appeals adjudication results in significant cash 
flow issues for appellants. These cash flow interruptions can be particularly 
troublesome for smaller providers and suppliers faced with significant 
overpayment demands resulting from post-payment audits.”). 
118. Press Release, supra note 52. 
119. Id. 
120. See Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5104. 
121. See e.g., Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-
JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38 (“Because of the consequent financial 
burden, some providers are ‘forced . . . to reduce costs, eliminate jobs, forgo 
services, and substantially scale back,’ all of which affects the quality and quantity 
of patient care.”); D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, 156 F.Supp. 3d 798, 815 (W.D. La. 
Jan. 12, 2016); see Hospice Savannah v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 
8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015). 
122. Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, Reimbursement & Exclusion, SHARP & COBOS 
http://sharpcobos.com/expertise/medicare-and-medicaid-reimbursement/ (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(ii) (2010); Adjudication Timeframes, supra note 94. 
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opportunity for an evidentiary hearing by a neutral arbiter.124 Second, the 
fourth level of appeal, DAB review, is equally backlogged and thus 
escalation from the ALJ only lands providers into another long queue.125 
Finally, escalating beyond both the ALJ and the DAB—straight into federal 
court—creates a different problem. Federal courts will generally give 
deference to the last agency determination on the record, which invariably 
found for the government.126 As a result, escalation as a remedy would deprive 
most providers their best chance to overturn the government’s overpayment 
determination.127 
The Medicare Appeals System no longer functions as it was designed. 
It cannot accommodate the number of appeals entering it, and providers 
are paying the consequences for the government’s bureaucratic failure. 
Delays deprive providers of access to their money while they wait for an ALJ 
hearing—a hearing that is more likely than not to prove that the money was 
wrongfully deprived. In the meantime, small providers in particular suffer 
serious financial consequences, facing insolvency as their money is 
temporarily deprived. And any administrative remedy available to them 
comes with serious sacrifice. But these harms extend beyond small 
providers. As explored in the next section, the financial implications of the 
System’s delays are passed onto consumers in various ways. 
III. Impact of the System’s Delays on Consumers and the Broader 
Healthcare System 
This Article has focused thus far on the consequences providers face 
due to the System’s delays. But the consequences exceed far beyond the 
providers’ experiences. These delays perpetuate systemic problems in the 
healthcare market, which in turn affect the healthcare that patients receive. 
In this section, I argue that the System’s delays cause four foreseeable 
effects: (1) the delays contribute to a consolidation of the healthcare 
market as small healthcare providers face insolvency and pressure to sell 
their practices to larger providers; (2) the regulatory burdens perpetuate 
providers’ frustration with Medicare, which could cause more providers to 
opt out of Medicare; (3) the lack of access to funds causes providers to cut 
patient services to accommodate short-term resource constraints; and (4) 
the increased scrutiny resulting from post-payment review may influence 
providers to make conservative treatment decisions. 
 
124. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
125. Id. at 186. 
126. Id. at 191. 
127. Id. 
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First, small healthcare providers are disproportionately impacted by 
the financial hardships the System’s delays cause.128 Large providers, like 
hospital chains, can spread risk across numerous institutions—if a company 
owns one hundred hospitals with a $100 million combined operating 
budget, its operations will not be heavily affected if one hospital’s post-
payment review ties up $5 million in the System.129 It simply has enough 
liquidity to endure the delay in getting a portion of that money back after 
the ALJ determination. Small providers, on the other hand, can face 
bankruptcy because of one or two bad audits.130 If an orthotic manufacturer 
with a $2 million operating budget is audited, and $400,000 of its revenue 
gets tied up in appeals, then it will struggle to continue business as usual as 
it waits.131 This threat increases pressure on small providers to consolidate 
with larger chains to compete in the market.132 And if the small businesses 
fold entirely, competition in the healthcare market also decreases. 
Furthermore, if small providers are forced to close their businesses in rural 
or underserved areas, then large providers may not fill in those gaps, 
causing those locations to become healthcare deserts. 
Recent consolidation of the healthcare market is a well-documented 
problem.133 Hospital chains are buying up smaller hospitals, insurance 
 
128. Press Release, supra note 52; Gustafson and Pendleton, supra note 117 (“Of 
particular importance, the delay in appeals adjudication results in significant cash 
flow issues for appellants . . . These cash flow interruptions can be particularly 
troublesome for smaller providers and suppliers faced with significant 
overpayment demands resulting from post-payment audits.”). 
129. See e.g., NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS OF SMALL 
FIRMS 8 (2010), available at: 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Regulatory%2
0Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full).pdf (“Considering all federal 
regulations . . . [compliance c]osts per employee thus appear to be at least 36 
percent higher in small firms than in medium-sized and large firms . . . . This is the 
familiar empirical phenomenon known as economies of scale, and its impact is to 
provide a comparative cost advantage to large firms over small firms.”). 
130. See D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 815; see Hospice Savannah v. Burwell, No. 
4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015); CTR FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES, PROGRAM HISTORY AND AUTHORITIES, 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-
Programs/recovery-audit-program-parts-c-and-d/Program-History-and-
Authorities.html (last updated May 12, 2017). 
131. Jessica L. Gustafson & Abby Pendleton, supra note 117. 
132. See Statement, Paul B. Ginsburg, Professor and Director of Public Safety, 
University of Southern California, Health Care Market Consolidations: Impacts on 
Costs, Quality and Access (March 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Ginsburg-California-Senate-Health-Mar-16-1.pdf. 
133. See Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium: The New Health Care Industry—Consolidation, 
Integration, Competition In The Wake Of The ACA, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 24, 
2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/24/symposium-the-new-health-
care-industry-consolidation- integration-competition-in-the-wake-of-the-aca/; 
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companies are merging, and service providers are joining forces.134 As of 
2012, two dialysis companies owned over seventy percent of the national 
market.135 This consolidation negatively impacts consumers because 
competition disappears, driving up prices, while innovation and patient 
choice falls.136 National healthcare costs are rising, in part, because of this 
market contraction: 
Rising health care costs are a matter of national alarm, and increasing 
attention has been paid to the growing market power accumulated 
by health care providers . . . . Moreover, much of the recent rise in 
health care costs is directly attributable to increases in supply-side 
market power that are products of hospital consolidations and the 
growth of provider collaborations.137 
Even more concerning is the fact that large healthcare providers have 
signaled their intention to use the savings from the 2017 tax reform law to 
consolidate the market further.138 
The healthcare market has constricted in recent years for a variety of 
reasons unrelated to the System.139 But the System’s delays add another 
source of pressure to consolidate. If a small provider faces insolvency as it 
waits for an ALJ determination, an easy solution is to sell its business to a 
larger provider who may be looking to increase its market share in a 
particular region or over a new product.140 In this way, small providers fall 
 
Paul Ginsburg, Health care market consolidations: Impacts on costs, quality and 
access, BROOKINGS INSTT. (March 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
testimonies/health-care-market-consolidations-impacts-on-costs-quality-and- 
access/. 
134. Id. 
135. Two Thriving Dialysis Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/29/us/two-thriving-dialysis-
companies.html?_r=1&. 
136. See Ginsburg, supra note 134. 
137. Barak D. Richman, Antitrust And Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return To Basics, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 125 (2007). 
138. See Caroline Humer and Carl O’Donnell, U.S. Pharma Executives Expect Deals to 
Pick Up After Tax Overhaul, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-conference-deals/u-s-pharma-
executives-expect-deals-to-pick-up-after-tax-overhaul-
idUSKBN1EY28E?wpisrc=nl_health202&wpmm=1; Bob Herman, Health Care 
Companies Are Thrilled About The Tax Overhaul, AXIOS (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.axios.com/health-care-companies-are-thrilled-about-the-tax-ov-
1515474626-1dfb8877-d64d-4d3e-a90b-
3ac8782a62f0.html?wpisrc=nl_health202&wpmm=1. 
139. Gluck, supra note 133; see Ginsburg, supra note 134. 
140. See BakerHostetler, Healthcare Providers Face Increasing Financial Pressure and 
Bankruptcy Risk, JDSUPRA.COM (June 13, 2014), 
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victims to a regulatory system that favors larger businesses that can 
withstand near-term financial loss. This is not the only instance where the 
government has been accused of incentivizing consolidation to consumers’ 
detriment.141 
Second, the System’s delays may also increase the tendency for small 
providers to opt out of Medicare.142 Many providers view the backlog as 
another instance of regulatory burden and providers have started to opt 
out of Medicare at higher rates.143 Though the government need not 
disclose the percentage of doctors that refuse to cover Medicare 
patients,144 some data exists for earlier years. From 2009-2012, the number 
of physicians that opted out of Medicare more than doubled.145 Twenty-
eight percent of family doctors have stopped accepting new Medicare 
patients.146 Providers reported that Medicare’s lower reimbursement rate 
and administrative burdens largely created this phenomenon.147 
 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/healthcare-providers-face-increasing-fin-
70502/. 
141. The Affordable Care Act incentivized providers to form Accountable Care 
Organizations (“ACOs”)— despite their many benefits, ACOs have been criticized 
for creating pressure to consolidate. Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, 
Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015), http://khn.org/news/aco-
accountable-care-organization-faq/ (“Many health care economists fear that the 
race to form ACOs could have a significant downside: hospital mergers and 
provider consolidation.”); Christopher Pope, How the Affordable Care Act Fuels 
Health Care Market Consolidation, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 1, 2014), 
https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/how-the-affordable-care-
act-fuels-health-care-market-consolidation. But see Hannah T. Neprash, Michael 
E. Chernew, & J. Michael McWilliams, Little Evidence Exists To Support The 
Expectation That Providers Would Consolidate To Enter New Payment Models, 36 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 346 (2017). 
142. See Virgil Dickson, Fewer Doctors are Opting Out of Medicare, 
MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.moder
nhealthcare.com/article/20180130/NEWS/180139995 
143. Id. 
144. Andrew Flowers, We May Finally Learn How Many Doctors are Opting Out of 
Medicare, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, (March 26, 2015), http://f
ivethirtyeight.com/datalab/data-transparency-gets-a-win-in-houses-medicare-
bill/. 
145. See id. 
146. Primary Care Physicians Accepting Medicare: A Snapshot, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/data-note-primary-care-physicians-
accepting-medicare-a-snapshot. [hereinafter A Snap-shot]; Melinda Beck, supra 
note 15. 
147. See Alan Tice, Access to Care: The Physician’s Perspective, 70 HAWAII MED J. 2011, 
33–38. (“One respondent indicated in the survey that they were ‘not planning to 
accept any more new Medicare patients due to numerous problems with 
reimbursement . . . it actually costs me to see Medicare patients when extra 
administrative costs are factored in.’”). 
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It is typically the small—and in-demand—physician practice groups 
that can disengage from the Medicare program; if a provider is popular 
enough to operate at full capacity without any Medicare patients, it might 
choose to avoid the hassle.148 The larger the provider, the more dependent 
they are on Medicare patients to generate patient base, and certain 
providers, like hospitals, could never opt out of Medicare.149 The Medicaid 
program has faced this problem to a much greater degree for decades. The 
result: many Medicaid patients struggle to find doctors that will treat 
them.150 Not only does this raise questions about accessibility, but also 
equality of care. When the most in-demand physicians refuse Medicare 
patients, older populations may struggle to access the best healthcare.151 
Third, the System delays cause providers to cut services, fire 
employees, and delay projects while waiting for the ALJ to return portions 
of the collected overpayment.152 The short-term deprivation of needed 
funds impacts even those providers that can better manage the financial 
hardship associated with the backlogs.153 Providers of all kinds are forced 
to make sacrifices—often at the expense of patients and employees—to 
offset the setback.154 For example, Baxter Regional Medical Center claimed 
that it had so much money tied up in the appeals process in 2012 that it 
could not “afford to replace a failing roof over its surgery department, 
purchase new beds for its Intensive Care Unit, engage in other basic upkeep, 
 
148. See A Snapshot, supra note 146 (“About two-thirds (67 percent) of primary care 
physicians age 55 or older say they accept new Medicare patients compared with 
about three-quarters (76 percent) of primary care physicians under age 55 (Figure 
3). Younger doctors may be more likely to be building their patient caseloads and, 
therefore, may be more willing to take new patients.”). 
149. For instance, federal law requires hospitals to treat all individuals in need of 
urgent care, and as a result, it wouldn’t make any sense for hospitals to not accept 
the insurance of a patient they are required to treat. Emergency Medical 
Treatment & Labor Act (EMTALA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/ (last 
visited April 1, 2018). 
150. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Payments and Access to Care, 371 N ENG. J. MED. 2345 
(2014); Brigid Goody, Medicare Dependent Hospitals: Who Depends on Whom?, 
14 HEALTH CARE FINAC. REV. 97, *4 (1992). 
151. See Jeffrey P. Harrison & Rachel M. Barksdale, The Impact of RAC Audits on US 
Hospitals, 39 J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE 1, 8 (2013); See AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N FACTS, supra 
note 57. 
152. See Statement from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Statement 
on Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013 (Mar. 19, 2013), 
https://www.aha.org/system/files/presscenter/pressrel/2013/130319-pr-
rac.pdf. 
153. RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1, at v-vi. 
154. Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,039 
(Nov. 10, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 455). 
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or purchase other necessary capital items.”155 Other facilities claim that 
they are forced to turn away patients, cut needed services, and eliminate 
jobs to endure the short-term loss.156 While some large providers may be 
making these cuts to avoid a reduction in their profit margins, small 
providers may have no other choice. 
Finally, on a long-term basis, the post-payment review process in 
general may cause providers to become increasingly conservative in 
treatment decisions. To avoid retrospective recoupment of Medicare 
payments, providers may error on the side of nonintervention for Medicare 
patients to avoid the hassle of having to appeal the government’s 
determination that the treatment was not medically necessary.157 
Nonintervention can harm patients when necessary care is delayed or 
avoided.158 Providers, of course, face many incentives that pull them in 
different directions. For example, medical malpractice risk and 
reimbursement schemes can incentivize providers to both over or 
undertreat patients.159 Overtreatment is similarly problematic because it 
can expose patients to unnecessary risks and lead to overspending.160 
Though physicians are not immune to incentives, professional obligations 
ethically require them to act in a patient’s best interest at all times, which 
tempers this general concern.161 It is unclear whether bureaucratic 
inefficiencies associated with post-payment reviews would impact 
providers’ decision making, but it’s important to be aware of the possible 
risk. 
The negative, systemic effects of the System’s delays are caused largely 
by the financial strain small providers face: patients pay more when small 
providers leave the healthcare market, have fewer choices when small 
providers opt out of Medicare, and receive worse healthcare when small 
providers cannot afford to maintain the facilities and services provided to 
 
155. Complaint at 5, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 
14 Civ. 851). 
156. Id. at 17; Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-
JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38. 
157. 4 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,038. (Nov. 10, 2010). 
158. See RACS: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE YOUR RISK AND SUCCESSFULLY APPEAL PAYMENT DENIALS 1, 
33 (Erin Trompeter ed., 2010). 
159. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 317 (2015). 
160. See Chanapa Tantibanchachai, In Survey, Doctors Say Unneeded Medical Care Is 
Common, Driven by Fear of Malpractice, HUB (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://hub.jhu.edu/2017/09/06/unneeded-medical-care-hopkins-survey/. 
161. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, ACP ETHICS MANUAL SIXTH EDITION (2012), available at: 
https://www.acponline.org/clinical-information/ethics-and-professionalism/acp-
ethics-manual-sixth- edition-a-comprehensive-medical-ethics-resource/acp-
ethics-manual-sixth-edition. 
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patients. This is important because the healthcare market still includes 
many small providers. According to CMS, “most providers and suppliers are 
small entities, either by nonprofit status or by having revenues of less than 
$7.5 million to $38.5 million in any one year.”162 To the extent that the 
System’s delays disproportionately burden small providers—and that 
burden negatively impacts the price and quality of healthcare—it is 
important to find a remedy that aids small providers. 
IV. Failed Regulatory and Legislative Solutions 
CMS is aware of the delays associated with the System and, after public 
pressure gathered, attempted to ease the backlog through various 
mechanisms. Settlement has been the agency’s most successful tactic thus 
far. In 2015, the agency settled roughly 300,000 inpatient-hospital claims 
that waited for ALJ review.163 The agency accomplished this mass 
settlement by offering to settle all pending inpatient hospital claims if the 
appellants would agree to pay 68 percent of the over-payment’s value at 
issue in the appeal.164 This was a popular solution: the government was able 
to quickly and easily reduce the number of appeals clogging the System and 
providers were able to make an informed business decision about whether 
to continue waiting for the ALJ or accept the deal. In 2016, CMS announced 
that it would continue the settlement program and settled additional 
claims.165 
Though settlement on this scale greatly reduced—in the short-term—
the appeals backlog, there are three criticisms of this program. First, the 
program has no effect on the pipeline of appeals entering the System or the 
System’s capacity to hear appeals; as a result, its impact is temporary.166 
Second, the program was only offered to certain kinds of hospitals and 
hospital chains; therefore, it excluded many providers, including small 
 
162. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement, Medicare 
Advantage Organization Determination, and Medicare Prescription Drug 
Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures, 82 Fed. Reg. 4974, 5105 (proposed 
Jan. 17, 2017). 
163. Memorandum Opinion at 11-13, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-
JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38. 
164. See Inpatient Hospital Reviews, CMS, http://cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-
Programs/Medical-Review/InpatientHospitalReviews.html (last updated June 6, 
2016) [hereinafter CMS, Inpatient Hospital Reviews]; see Reed Abelson, Medicare 
Will Settle Short-Term Care Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/business/medicare-will-settle-appeals-of-
short-term-care- bills.html?_r=0. 
165. See CMS, Inpatient Hospital Reviews, supra note 169. 
166. See e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 38 n.64 (“Although the 
global settlement significantly reduced the backlog, it ended in 2015, and 
therefore, will not have an effect on the current backlog.”). 
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providers like physician practice groups, home health-care agencies, and 
hospices.167 Third, the structure of the settlement offer creates bad 
incentives. The less confident an appellant is in the strength of its appeal, 
the more likely it would be to settle. On the other hand, appellants who 
believed they were likely to win on appeal—and could withstand the wait—
were more likely to reject the offer. As a result, more frivolous claims were 
settled and CMS may have lost money in the long run by forfeiting portions 
of valid overpayments. Finally, as explored below, the more desperate the 
provider is, the more likely it will be to settle with the agency regardless of 
the strength of its appeal. Large providers can therefore choose to wait if 
they think they will win before an ALJ, but the more vulnerable small 
providers will often be forced into settlement. 
In addition to settlement, CMS also attempted to improve the backlog 
through rulemaking. CMS’s rule (the “Rule”), which became effective March 
20, 2017, aimed to streamline the appeals process so that its fixed budget 
could resolve more appeals.168 The Rule was issued as one prong of a three-
pronged approach that, if implemented in its entirety, could eliminate the 
backlog by 2021.169 The agency, however, lacks control over the two other 
prongs: additional funding and legislative reforms. Both require 
congressional action.170 The agency can only create regulations aimed to 
streamline the System so that it becomes more efficient, which is exactly 
what the Rule aims to do.171 The agency acknowledges that “this final rule 
makes only minimal changes to the existing appeals procedures” and 
therefore “[it] would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.”172 
 
167. See Amy Kearbey & Nicholas Alarif, CMS Announces New Settlement Initiative 
Addressing Medicare Appeals Backlog, Enhancing Provider Appeal Options, 
MCDERMOTTWILL&EMERY (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-
leadership/publications/2018/01/cms-announces-new-settlement-initiative. 
168. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5104. 
169. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 10. 
170. Medicare Program Changes 81 Fed. Reg. 43, 792 (emphasis added) (“(1) request 
new resources to invest at all levels of appeal to increase adjudication capacity 
and implement new strategies to alleviate the current backlog; (2) take 
administrative actions to reduce the number of pending appeals and implement 
new strategies to alleviate the current backlog; and (3) propose legislative reforms 
that provide additional funding and new authorities to address the volume of 
appeals.”). 
171. The Rule purports to “address the Medicare appeals backlog and create 
efficiencies at the ALJ level of appeal by allowing OMHA to reassign a portion of 
workload to non-ALJ adjudicators and reduce procedural ambiguities that result 
in unproductive efforts at OMHA and unnecessary appeals to the Medicare 
Appeals Council.” Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 5104. 
172. Id. at 5,105. 
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The Rule’s most significant modifications to the System include 
replacing ALJs with attorney adjudicators in certain circumstances.173 
OMHA will employ and train these attorney adjudicators.174 Their decisions 
would carry the same weight as ALJs, but they could rule only on issues that 
do not require an evidentiary hearing.175 This reform, though creative, is 
unlikely to seriously curb the problem. By the agency’s own estimates, this 
proposal would only redirect roughly 24,500 appeals per year from ALJs to 
attorney adjudicators.176 The 600,000 pending appeals heavily overshadow 
that number.177 Further, this proposal will incur additional costs as OMHA 
will need to employ and compensate these attorney adjudicators, so 
removing the 24,500 appeals per year will cost additional money. 
Another of the agency’s reforms will give the DAB precedential 
authority.178 Unlike the current system—where ALJs and the DAB must look 
at every appeal in a vacuum—the finalized proposal allows decision-makers 
to build on previous decisions.179 Precedential DAB decisions would be 
published in the federal register and would be binding on the first three 
levels of the System.180 An important advantage of this reform is that 
providers and Medicare contractors would receive better notice of the 
agency’s interpretation of its laws such that they could better predict 
decisions and conform their conduct to the rules.181 Though the hope is that 
this proposal would reduce adjudicators’ time and effort, the Rule provides 
no estimate for the impact of precedential decisions.182 This proposal is 
unlikely to seriously combat the severity of the appeals backlog, especially 
in the short term. 
 
173. Id. at 4,981-82. 
174. Id. at 4,983. 
175. Id. at 4,982 (“[A]ttorney adjudicators [can] issue decisions when a decision can be 
issued without an ALJ conducting a hearing under the regulations, to dismiss 
appeals when an appellant withdraws his or her request for an ALJ hearing, and 
to remand appeals for information that can only be provided by CMS or its 
contractors or at the direction of the Council, as well as to conduct reviews of QIC 
and IRE dismissals.”). 
176. Id. at 5,104. 
177. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. 
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58. 
178. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4,977. 
179. See id. 
180. Id. 
181. See Constance B. Tobias, DAB Chair Implementing Medicare Appeals Precedent 
Rule, Welcomes Suggestions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Oct. 27 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/blog/2017/10/27/medicare-appeals-precedent-rule.html. 
182. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5,104-05. 
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The agency will also limit the instances in which providers can submit 
new evidence in an ALJ hearing.183 If the provider did not submit a piece of 
evidence at the Reconsideration stage, the provider must show good cause 
for this omission or the evidence will be excluded at later stages.184 This 
proposal could be detrimental to providers that may not be able to gather 
all of the necessary evidence within the timeframe for a Reconsideration 
submission.185 And the government provides no estimate for how this 
suggestion would reduce the appeals backlog.186 Though CMS also 
proposed other administrative tweaks to the System, none of them were 
associated with a measurable reduction in the appeals backlog.187 
CMS estimated that its Rule would remove fewer than 30,000 appeals 
per year from the System.188 This is a disappointing figure—and one that 
would only have prospective impact without affecting the current backlog 
of appeals. As a result, the proposed rule alone—without corresponding 
budget and legislative changes—will be insufficient. As of September 1, 
2017, the agency admitted that, even presuming all of its regulatory and 
settlement proposals are fully implemented, and considering all changes 
the agency has made in the past few years to combat the problem,189 the 
backlog will still grow every year between FY2017 and FY2021. The current 
estimate is that the appeals backlog will grow to 972,591 by FY2021 (almost 
300,000 more than today).190 The agency’s solutions are failing, and it is 
impos-sible for the agency to maintain the status quo without legislative 
intervention. Recognizing the limitations of regulatory solutions, the agency 
has suggested two legislative proposals that it believes could solve the 
problem. 
The agency’s first legislative proposal was to increase OMHA’s budget. 
The agency requested a 2017 budget increase of roughly $270 million 
dollars for the office responsible for the ALJ and DAB appeals.191 This budget 
would have required Congress to more than double the current funding at 
 
183. Id. at 5,043. 
184. See id. at 5,045. 
185. MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47, at 5. 
186. See Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5,104-
5. 
187. See id. 
188. Id. 
189. For a good summary of the changes the agency has already adopted to curb the 
appeals crisis, see Memorandum Opinion at 11-13, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 
No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38. 
190. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. 
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58. 
191. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3. 
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a time when budgets are strapped.192 As expected, Congress did not grant 
this request, and OMHA’s budget for 2017 stayed stable at $107 million.193 
Congress also refused to grant the agency’s request for a funding increase 
in 2015 and 2016.194 The agency recently renewed its request for a 
substantial budgetary increase, which the President’s budget endorsed, but 
there is little evidence that Congress will adopt it.195 
Under the second legislative proposal, the agency suggested that 
Congress institute legislative reforms to reduce the number of appeals 
needing review.196 The agency’s suggested legislative fix would include a 
provision to shift the cost of ALJ and DAB appeals onto the recovery auditors 
themselves. That is, part of the contingency fee gathered from RACs would 
pay for the cost of appeals.197 This proposal would temper the effect of the 
contingency-fee arrangement: if RACs paid for the additional appeals their 
audits cause, they might be more likely to avoid controversial overpayment 
determinations. This suggestion, however, has never been picked up in any 
proposed legislation. 
Instead, in 2015, Congress proposed the Audit & Appeal Fairness, 
Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act (the “AFIRM Act”), which 
incorporates different legislative recommendations.198 It is no longer 
active,199 but when the bill was introduced, it contained more controversial 
reforms, such as increasing the amount-in-controversy requirement for an 
ALJ hearing—from $150 to $1,500—and allowing ALJs to render decisions 
without an evidentiary hearing in certain cases.200 The AFIRM Act did not 
recommend any substantive changes to the RAP program, a fact that 
frustrated providers.201 It did, however, propose to increase OMHA’s 
 
192. Id. at 8. 
193. HHS FY 2018 Budget in Brief-OMHA, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/abou
t/budget/fy2018/budget-in-brief/omha/index.html#ftno1 (last updated May 23, 
2017) [hereinafter HHS FY 2018 Budget]. 
194. Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. 
Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38. 
195. HHS FY 2018 Budget, supra note 193; Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58. 
196. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE APPEALS PROCESS, 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf (last 
visited March 25, 2018). 
197. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 9. 
198. Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 2015, S. 2368, 
114th Cong. (2015). 
199. Id, 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
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budget and track the RAP reversal rates to maintain better quality control 
over the program.202 
Despite Congress’s awareness of the growing problem, the AFIRM Act 
sat unattended for over a year. In September 2016, D.C. District Court 
discussed the AFIRM Act’s stagnancy in Congress as it reviewed a legal 
challenge to System’s delays: 
[I]t has been 21 months since the AFIRM Act was reported by the 
Senate Finance Committee to the full Senate on December 8, 2015. 
No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the Secretary offers no 
evidence that any legislative action is imminent, that the bill has 
support in the House of Representatives, or that the President would 
sign it.203 
The court concluded that “Congress is unlikely to play the role of the 
cavalry here, riding to the rescue of the Secretary’s besieged program.”204 
Two other bills modifying the RAP were introduced in 2012 and 2013 and 
similarly never made it out of committee.205 
On May 23, 2017, the President released his FY2018 President’s 
Budget.206 It included a series of legislative proposals to curb the appeals 
backlog.207 First, it proposed to remand appeals back to the Redeter-
mination stage if the appellant introduces new evidence.208 Second, like the 
AFIRM Act, it proposed to increase the amount-in-controversy requirement 
to $1,560, with annual increases.209 Third, it proposed to establish 
magistrate adjudication.210 And finally, it proposed to expedite claims that 
lack material factual disputes.211 The agency estimated that if Congress 
adopted all of these proposals, the backlog would shrink to 353,603 appeals 
by FY2021 (compared to the nearly one million pending appeals by FY2021 
without them).212 Nevertheless, there has been no indication from Congress 
 
202. Id 
203. Memorandum Opinion at 15, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB 
(D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38. 
204. Id. at 16. 
205. Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6575, 112th Cong. (2012); 
Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 1250, 113th Cong. (2013). 
206. Dec. of Jennifer Moughalian at 4, Am. Hosp. Ass’n. v. Price, No. 14-cv-00851 (D.C. 
Cir. Aug. 11, 2017) 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 5. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 5-6. 
212. Id. at 6. 
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that it intends to act on this issue and given the current state of 
Congressional gridlock, it is unlikely that Congress will step in to fix the 
problem at any point in the near future. 
The agency, acting in a vacuum, is largely powerless to solve the 
ultimate problem. It cannot increase its budget to process more appeals per 
year or reform the current programs responsible for the increasing number 
of appeals entering the System. It is therefore unsurprising that CMS’s 
attempted solutions—mass settlements and rulemaking—have been 
largely ineffective to cause any real change. 
But even if the agency cannot solve the underlying issues that created 
the backlog, it can improve the financial stress providers’ face while they 
wait.213 For instance, the agency could delay its recoupment until after the 
ALJ determination. The Social Security Act prevents CMS from recouping 
overpayments before Reconsideration decisions.214 CMS, however, has 
discretion to delay recoupment beyond Reconsideration without violating 
the Act. Through rulemaking, it could modify its own guidance to delay 
recoupment.215 This reform could make a big difference because, as 
discussed above, small providers are disproportionately impacted by the 
financial strain associated with the delays. As a result, this change would 
particularly help small businesses endure the wait times and mitigate the 
broader consequences on the healthcare market discussed in Section III. It 
would also reduce the administrative cost associated with money changing 
hands three times, instead of twice. 
Delaying recoupment by rulemaking would not cure the problem—at 
some point, Congress must dramatically change either the pipeline of 
appeals or the capacity of OMHA to hear them—but it would alleviate the 
harshest symptoms of this problem until legislation passed. In fact, some 
small providers have sued the agency, arguing that it should be prohibited 
from collecting overpayments until after the ALJ hearing, discussed in depth 
below. CMS, however, has heavily resisted any effort to postpone 
recoupment, claiming that it would “upset the careful balance of interests 
accomplished through the present construction of the Medicare statute 
 
213. Some regulatory solutions have been proposed in articles that were published 
before—or without consideration of—providers’ recent legal victories. Kinney, 
supra note 47, at 133 (suggesting an “inquisitorial system” that would allow 
providers and their counsel to interact directly with reviewers); Michelle Ellis, The 
Medicare Appeals Crisis: Why Mediation Is The Medicine, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
61 (2016) (supporting mediation to relieve the backlog); Mary Squire, RAC: A 
Program In Distress, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 219, 253-54 (2015) (proposing various 
reforms); Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 79, 108 
(2017) (arguing that HHS should focus on providing full process to certain non-
corporate appellants should). 
214. 42 U.S.C.§1395ddd(f)(2) (2010). 
215. See LIMITATION ON RECOUPMENT, supra note 87; MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 
47. 
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and regulations.”216 But the government has not explained or substantiated 
why delaying recoup-ment would financially harm the agency.217 And the 
evidence might suggest otherwise: CMS has lost as much as $17.8 million in 
interest payments to Medicare providers between 2010 and 2015 because 
it recouped overpayments that ultimately needed to be returned to 
providers with interest.218 Of the $17.8 million, CMS paid $13 million to 
providers in 2014 and 2015 when the delays were the longest.219 
CMS has also objected to delaying recoupment because it would 
increase, rather than decrease, the backlog.220 The idea is that appel-lants 
are more likely to appeal to an ALJ and endure the wait times if they are not 
financially burdened while they wait.221 But this objection misses the mark. 
Providers are always incentivized to appeal their claims because the 
alternative is to pay back the full amount immed-iately.222 Regardless of 
whether they appeal, CMS will recoup payments, so the practice is to 
appeal everything in the hopes that some of the recoupment will be repaid. 
Indeed, the government frequently laments that providers appeal every 
claim regardless of its merit.223 Because providers are already incentivized 
to appeal every claim despite financial burden, delaying recoupment will 
not have the impact the government claims. 
CMS may dislike the idea of delayed recoupment for a more nefarious 
reason: CMS can use time as a weapon once providers start to feel financial 
pressure. For example, CMS can negotiate harsh settlements with providers 
 
216. Reply Memorandum In Opposition To Preliminary Injunction at 8, D&G Holdings, 
156 F. Supp. 3d. at 798. 
217. Id. In another matter, the government did claim that delayed recoupment would 
have “disastrous” financial implications for the Medicare Trust funds because 
“CMS collects an average of $153 million in principal and $15 million in interest a 
year after the second level of appeal.” Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgement at 13, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d.183. However, delaying recoupment 
would not take away this revenue source, but postpone it. The government failed 
to give any account for why the government would be significantly harmed by the 
delay—i.e., why it needs this money in the short term. Id. 
218. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 21. 
219. Id. 
220. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 13, D & G Holding, 156 F. Supp. 
3d. at 798. 
221. Id. 
222. Jacqueline Belliveau, Can Changes to Medicare Reimbursement Appeals Reduce 
Backlog?, REVCYCLEINTELLIGENCE (Aug 31, 2016), 
https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/can-changes-to-medicare-
reimbursement-appeals-reduce-backlog. 
223. See e.g., HHS PRIMER, supra note 84 (3), at 7 (“HHS is aware of two elements of the 
existing appeals structure that appear to contribute to a growing sense among 
some appellants and their representatives that appealing every claim is a good 
business practice.”). 
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or wait for companies to file for bankruptcy, never able to appear before an 
ALJ.224 Judge Henderson on the D.C. Circuit recently worried about this 
possibility: 
[B]argaining power is a two-way street. Subjecting the average 
claimant to a waiting period more than eleven times longer than the 
statute permits—and thereby choking off cash flow for basic 
operational needs—unfairly weakens the claimant’s position, giving 
it every incentive to settle for only a fraction of what it might win 
after years of litigation.225 
CMS should consider delaying recoupment to ease the financial burden 
on small providers—it is the only administrative remedy that could mitigate 
the consequences of the System’s collapse. And if it refuses to correct this 
problem itself, courts might step in to demand the same outcome. 
Without real solutions on the horizon from either Congress or the 
agency, providers have pursued creative ways to challenge the status quo 
through federal litigation. Litigation of this sort is typically very difficult 
because courts tend to dismiss unexhausted claims and defer to agencies in 
the administration of their programs. But recently, courts have been willing 
to consider providers’ challenges and question the government’s 
conduct.226 The next section explores these lawsuits and the impact 
proposed remedies might have on small providers in par-ticular. It argues 
that the best legal remedy would be to force to agency to delay 
recoupment, at least until Congress is able to legislate a long-term solution. 
V. The Promise of Federal Litigation 
Providers frustrated with the lack of regulatory and legislative solutions 
have sued the agency in federal court. These lawsuits have largely pursued 
two challenges. First, providers have brought challenges in mandamus 
aimed at forcing compliance with the statutory deadlines.227 Second, 
providers have brought due process challenges aimed at delaying 
recoupment until after providers have been afforded an ALJ hearing.228 The 
 
224. Squire, supra note 213, at 247 (“CMS is fully aware of the financial predicament 
that providers confront when a large portion of their revenue faces the possibility 
of termination. The agency has nothing to lose by dragging the proceedings on for 
years. Many providers may be willing to settle claims for a smaller amount than 
initially demanded out of a fear of losing their entire business as an alternative, 
even when they believe the denials were made in error.”). 
225. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 172 (Henderson, J., dissenting). 
226. David Tolley and Greer Donley, A Favorable, New Climate for Challenging 
Medicare Appeals, 27 MEDICARE REPORT (BNA) No. 737 (Aug. 12, 2016). 
227. A writ of mandamus orders the government to comply with the law. See Am. Hosp. 
Ass’n, 812 F.3d 183; see supra Sections V.A. 
228. See D &G Holding, 156 F.Supp. 3d at 798; see supra Sections V.B. 
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former would attempt to fix the delays without altering the agency’s 
timeline for recoupment; the latter would attempt to postpone 
recoupment without altering the length of the delays. These two strategies 
reflect the types of providers who filed the lawsuits. The main plaintiff in 
the mandamus lawsuit was the American Hospital Association (“AHA”), a 
powerful lobbying organization representing a variety of facilities and 
hospital systems.229 On the other hand, small providers under threat of 
bankruptcy have typically sued under the Due Process Clause.230 AHA has 
the financial capacity to withstand years of litigation as the D.C. District 
Court weighs the merits. But the small provider plaintiffs have settled their 
lawsuits against the agency quickly, even when the courts appeared 
sympathetic to their arguments by awarding preliminary relief.231 
On December 5, 2016, the D.C. District Court granted a writ of 
mandamus to force the agency to comply with its statute requiring an ALJ 
hearing within ninety days.232 The future of the writ is uncertain after the 
D.C. Circuit recently questioned whether it was possible for the government 
to comply with it.233 But regardless, I argue below that mandamus is not the 
proper remedy as it fails to protect small providers, especially in the short-
term. Instead, the writ may give large providers unique leverage while 
negotiating with the agency, perpetuating the disproportionate harm small 
providers experience. A due process remedy, on the other hand, would 
protect small providers by preventing the agency from recouping a 
provider’s Medicare payments before the provider has received an ALJ 
determination. Removing this financial strain will help small providers 
avoid bankruptcy, cut needed patient services, and resist the pressure to 
consolidate with larger providers or opt out of Medicare—thus helping 
healthcare consumers. This section explores the feasibility of a due process 
 
229. About the AHA, AM. HOSPITAL ASSN., http://www.aha.org/about/index.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
230. Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253-JRH-GRS, 2015 WL 8488432, 
at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015); D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d. at 798. 
231. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La. 
Apr. 26, 2016), ECF. 100; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-
cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2015), ECF No. 24. 
232. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167291, at *8 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 5, 
2016). 
233. The district court is now reconsidering its decision after the D.C. Circuit required 
it to determine whether it was possible for HHS to comply with this remedy. Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). On March 22, 2018, the district 
court stayed the case for three months and ordered the plaintiff to submit specific 
proposals for a mandamus order with which the government could possibly 
comply. Minute Order, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. :14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. 
March 22, 2018), ECF No. 81. 
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challenge, including the significant legal and practical hurdles providers 
must overcome to litigate the issue to finality. 
A. Litigation Seeking to Force Compliance with the 90-Day Timeframe 
There are many possible mechanisms to challenge the System’s delays 
based on the agency’s failure to abide by the statutory mandate, including 
a writ of mandamus, ultra vires, or through the Admin-istrative Procedures 
Act. Requesting a writ of mandamus—a strategy AHA adopted in 2014—has 
been the most successful approach, though its future is currently uncertain. 
The D.C. District Court initially dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, 
but in May 2016, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded for a decision on 
the merits.234 In a strongly worded opinion, the Circuit found that it had 
jurisdiction and that a writ was warranted if the legislature failed to fix 
problem itself: 
Taking the above factors into account, the district court—more than 
a year after its first denial and with the problem only worsening—
might find it appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the 
Secretary to cure the systemic failure to comply with the 
deadlines . . . . Given this, and given the unique circumstances of this 
case, the clarity of the statutory duty likely will require issuance of 
the writ if the political branches have failed to make meaningful 
progress within a reasonable period of time—say, the close of the 
next full appropriations cycle.235 
This opinion came after the Fourth Circuit considered the same issue 
months earlier and held it lacked jurisdiction to hear a mandamus action.236 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision revitalized providers that hoped for a legal 
remedy to cure the System’s delays. 
As soon as the D.C. Circuit remanded AHA to the district court, the 
agency moved to stay the litigation until September 2017 so that it had 
more time to fix the problem itself.237 The district court refused to grant the 
agency’s stay238 and eventually issued a writ of mandamus, which ordered 
the agency to comply with its statutory obligation to provide an ALJ hearing 
within ninety days.239 The court recognized that compliance could not be 
immediate, but nevertheless required the agency to eliminate the backlog 
by 2021 with incremental reductions each year—“i.e., 30% reduction from 
 
234. Id. 
235. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d at 193. 
236. Cumberland Co. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2016). 
237. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
238. Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. 
Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38. 
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the current backlog of cases pending at the ALJ level by December 31, 2017; 
60% by December 31, 2018; 90% by December 31, 2019; and 100% by 
December 31, 2020.”240 
In a surprising twist, the D.C. Circuit again reversed and remanded to 
the district court, finding that it failed to consider whether it was impossible 
for the agency to legally comply with the writ.241 And because the judiciary 
cannot order the government to do the impossible, the district court was 
required to first decide possibility.242 The D.C. Circuit raises an important 
question: how will the agency suddenly be able to drain the backlog after 
attempting to do so for years with little improvement? The answer: it will 
not. Judge Boasberg expressed this sentiment in his September 2016 
opinion: “the Court, however, does not possess a magic wand that, when 
waved, will eliminate the backlog. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Court 
simply order HHS to resolve each of the pending appeals by the statutorily 
prescribed deadlines is extremely wishful thinking.”243 But while a writ of 
mandamus cannot suddenly fix the ALJ capacity problem, it pressures 
Congress to act and the agency to shift priorities even more dramatically to 
accommodate as many appeals as possible. After all, why should the 
government’s inability to fix its broken System burden providers instead of 
the government? 
Settlement would be the easiest—and perhaps the only—way for the 
agency to reduce the backlog and comply with the writ of mandamus. 
Settlement will allow the agency to quickly reduce the number of pending 
appeals without fundamentally altering the System’s procedures or the 
agency’s recoupment timeline. The agency’s mass settlements have thus 
far been the only improvement that has made any significant impact on the 
backlog. And in December 2016, CMS decided to extend its mass settlement 
program.244 As CMS continues to feel the pressure to settle, providers may 
start to gain leverage against the agency to negotiate highly favorable 
settlements and dismiss their claims for a portion of the potential 
overpayment.245 The agency argued recently before the D.C. Circuit that 
 
240. Id. at *8. 
241. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 160. 
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(D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38. 
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Medicare Appeals Delays: Is Victory Likely for Medicare Providers?, 27 MEDICARE 
REPORT (BNA) No. 938 (Oct. 6, 2016). 
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settlement was its only option for compliance with the writ, and that it 
might be forced to settle frivolous claims at a significant loss.246 
If HHS pursues settlement to clear the backlog, it will likely reinforce 
the disparity among small and large providers. Large hospital chains with 
many appeals pending in the System will have more leverage with the 
agency looking to dismiss a large number of claims. If they are not happy 
with the agency’s offer, they can reject it knowing that they have the 
financial security to wait for their hearing. Small providers appealing fewer 
claims will have less leverage to negotiate favorable deals and feel more 
desperate to accept any offer that will return some portion of their 
recouped payment.247 As a result, small providers can be pressured into 
unfavorable settlements, while large providers can harness a writ of 
mandamus to their advantage. 
The AHA—a powerful organization representing both large corporate 
hospital chains as well as individual facilities—has the financial capacity to 
litigate the issue fully.248 The primary remedy requested, compliance with 
the 90-day statute, was not aimed at serving its most vulnerable members, 
but providing broad relief. As a result, this remedy does not attempt to 
relieve small providers of the burdens associated with waiting. And while it 
provides needed recourse to correct the egregious delays, it cannot be the 
sole solution, at least not in the short term before the backlog is fully 
emptied. 
B. Litigation Seeking to Delay Recoupment Until After the ALJ Hearing 
Some providers have pursued another litigation strategy: challenging 
the agency’s conduct under the Due Process Clause. Unlike a mandamus 
challenge, which would attempt to compel the government to act in 
accordance with its statutory mandate, a procedural due process claim 
would ask a court to prevent the government from recouping 
overpayments until after an ALJ determination. In short, this challenge asks 
the court to find that recoupment before an ALJ hearing unconstitutionally 
deprives providers of their property without due process. It would not, 
however, impact the length of the delays, only the burden associated with 
waiting. This litigation strategy would be particularly helpful for small 
providers who could thereby avoid the financial strain of erroneous 
recoupment. Though two small providers have been successful at winning 
 
246. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 167. The agency argued that it would be illegal 
to require it to settle frivolous claims. Id. 
247. Id.at 177 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (noting that a provider’s financial exigency 
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preliminary relief under this theory, their cases settled before the merits 
could be litigated.249 
This section explores whether a due process challenge has merit and 
the many legal and practical challenges that could prevent a due process 
claim from being litigated to finality. If a provider could successfully and 
fully litigate a due process challenge, however, it would force the agency to 
do what it is refusing to do in its rulemaking: delay recoupment until after 
an ALJ hearing. Without this pressure, the agency will likely continue to 
refuse this needed reform. 
1. Exploring the Merits of a Due Process Claim 
The first step in any due process claim is to identify the liberty or 
property interest at stake—only then is due process required.250 After 
demonstrating that a constitutionally protected property interest exists, 
providers must prove the government deprived them of that property 
interest without due process. To make this showing, plaintiffs will need to 
demonstrate that the first two levels of the System provide insufficient 
procedural protections to justify a deprivation of property. This analysis 
generally involves a balancing of the government’s burden in providing 
additional process and the plaintiff’s harm if the additional process is 
denied. 
To prove that a constitutionally protected interest is at stake, plaintiffs 
must show that they are entitled to payment for the services they provide 
to Medicare beneficiaries.251 The Constitution does not create property 
rights; “[r]ather [property rights] are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain 
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”252 The 
Medicare statute can be read to create this entitlement, noting the 
following with respect to Part A providers: 
the Secretary shall periodically determine the amount which should 
be paid under this part to each provider of services with respect 
 
249. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La. 
Apr. 26, 2016); Order, see Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-00253-
JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 24. 
250. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (“But, to 
determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must 
look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must look 
to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty 
and property.”) (internal citations omitted). 
251. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71 (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a 
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to it.”). 
252. Id. at 577. 
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to the services furnished by it, and the provider of services shall be 
paid, at such time or times as the Secretary believes appropriate (but 
not less often than monthly) . . . .253 
Perhaps the best evidence of this entitlement is the fact that CMS pays 
the provider for services rendered before completing its post-payment 
reviews. 
Mathews v. Eldridge254 established the modern test for evaluating 
whether an agency provided due process before it affected a party’s liberty 
or property interest. Mathews followed in the footsteps of Goldberg v. 
Kelly—where the Supreme Court held that an agency could not deprive 
individuals of their welfare benefits without first providing welfare 
beneficiaries with a pre-deprivation ALJ hearing.255 Mathews constrained 
Goldberg’s holding by limiting the incidences in which agencies must 
provide a pre-deprivation hearing.256 Recognizing that such a requirement 
can come with significant governmental costs, the Court created a 
balancing test to weigh the various interests at stake: 
[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
[2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
procedural or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.257 
After weighing these factors in a new context—disability benefits—the 
Mathews Court held that it was constitutional to deprive individuals of their 
disability benefits prior to an ALJ hearing—i.e., that a pre-deprivation 
hearing was not required for disability beneficiaries as it had been for 
welfare beneficiaries.258 
Mathews did not overturn Goldberg.259 Though Mathews involved a 
nearly identical claim to Goldberg, the Court distinguished itself from 
Goldberg on three factors. First, it found that the deprivation of welfare 
benefits was more significant than the deprivation of disability benefits.260 
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Second, it found that a pre-deprivation hearing in the disability context was 
marginally less beneficial than in the welfare context.261 Finally, the Court 
concluded that the government’s burden in providing a pre-deprivation 
hearing in the disability context was high and outweighed the beneficiaries’ 
interests (unlike in the welfare context).262 
To win a due process challenge, providers would need to argue that 
their due process claims are more similar to Goldberg than Mathews and 
that the balancing test favors them. Courts are generally reluctant to 
require agencies to provide additional process. Small providers, however, 
could realistically argue that this is an exceptional circumstance given the 
severe financial ramifications, high likelihood of success before an ALJ, and 
low governmental cost. In so doing, they might have to concede that when 
the System functioned normally, it was not constitutionally deficient.263 
a. The Severity of the Interest Affected 
The severity associated with the property deprivation is a significant 
part of the balancing test. In Goldberg, the Court worried that an erroneous 
deprivation of welfare benefits could render beneficiaries destitute; “thus, 
the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid pending 
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient 
of the very means by which to live while he waits.”264 Conversely, in 
Mathews, the Court relied significantly on its view that an erroneous 
deprivation of disability benefits would be less likely to threaten a 
beneficiary’s ability to survive, stating: “still, the disabled worker’s need is 
likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient . . . other forms of 
government assistance will become available where the termination of 
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence 
level.”265 In other words, the Court reasoned that because disability 
beneficiaries could obtain other forms of assistance, like welfare, if they 
become destitute while waiting for an ALJ determination, they were less 
 
termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below the 
subsistence level.”). 
261. Id. at 343-44 (“[A medical assessment] is a more sharply focused and easily 
documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitle-ment. In 
[welfare hearings], a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and 
issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decision making 
process.”). 
262. Id. at 347-49. 
263. See e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making And Appeal 
Procedures: Can Process Meet The Challenge Of New Medical Technology?, 60 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461 (2003) (exploring due process in the Medicare Appeals 
System long before the delays began in the context of challenging Medicare 
coverage determinations). 
264. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis added). 
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likely to suffer extreme hardship if their disability benefits were erroneously 
deprived in the meantime. 
Erroneous deprivation of Medicare payments while providers wait for 
an ALJ hearing forces many businesses266 to face the corporate equivalent 
of the harm announced in Goldberg: bankruptcy.267 According to Goldberg, 
when a property deprivation threatens the “very means by which to live 
while [the beneficiary] waits,” the deprivation is severe.268 There is no more 
severe consequence to a business than facing dissolution as it waits for the 
government to correct its erroneous deprivation. One practical implication 
is that small providers genuinely facing dissolution are the best positioned 
to prove the requisite level of severity under the Due Process Clause. As a 
result, it is unsurprising that the two plaintiffs who have successfully raised 
this claim were small providers.269 
Another factor that can impact severity is the length of the delay.270 If 
the delay is so long that a party cannot be heard “at a meaningful time,” 
then the deprivation is more severe.271 In Mathews, the Court noted that 
the average wait for an ALJ hearing was between ten and eleven months. 
Though the Court found that timeframe “torpid[],” it was not so severe as 
to outweigh the court’s findings on the other factors.272 The delays faced by 
 
266. A Medicare provider’s due process challenge affects businesses as opposed to the 
individuals affected in Goldberg and Mathews. Because the Supreme Court has 
held on numerous occasions that corporations and business associations are 
guaranteed the same Fourteenth Amendment rights as natural persons, the fact 
that Medicare providers are businesses should not affect the analysis in any legally 
relevant way. Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 
181, 189 (1888) (“Under the designation of ‘person’ there is no doubt that a 
private corporation is included [in the Fourteenth Amendment]. Such 
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose 
and permitted to do business under a particular name and have a succession of 
members without dissolution.”); Nw. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906) 
(“It is true, also, that a corporation of one state, doing business in another state, 
under such circumstances as to be directly subject to its process at the instance of 
suitors, may invoke the protection of that clause of the 14th Amendment which 
declares that no state shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.’”). 
267. Press Release, supra note 52. Not all healthcare providers are seriously affected 
by the property deprivation. In particular, large hospital chains might be well 
suited to absorb the delays. As a result, this challenge might need to be made on 
an as-applied basis. 
268. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 340. 
269. D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 798; see Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 
4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015). 
270. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 
(1975)). 
271. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. 
272. Id. at 341-42. 
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Medicare providers are years longer than those at issue in Mathews and 
grow every month.273 Because of them, some small providers may no longer 
exist by the time of their hearing, which supports the argument that they 
could not be heard at a mean-ingful time. 
b. The Likelihood That an ALJ Hearing Would Improve Agency Decision Making 
The second factor of the Mathews analysis “is the fairness and 
reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.”274 The fundamental 
inquiry is whether adding procedural protections before property 
deprivation will improve the reliability of the outcomes.275 Here, the 
additional safeguard would be an ALJ hearing before recoupment. ALJs 
provide two primary procedural protections that are lacking in Recon-
sideration and Redetermination. First, ALJ hearings provide the initial 
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on the merits.276 Second, OMHA—
the agency under which ALJ hearings occur—is located under HHS, not CMS, 
and its ALJs are therefore less susceptible to bias. 
A fair hearing “require[s] that a recipient have . . . effective oppor-
tunity to defend themselves by confronting any adverse witnesses and by 
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.”277 It is undisputed that 
an ALJ hearing is the first point that providers can present evidence and 
raise their arguments orally before an arbiter.278 The GAO, for instance, 
attributed the “high reversal rates at Level 3 [i.e., the ALJ hearing], in part, 
to the opportunity for hearings and presentation of new evidence . . . ”279 
As the GAO noted, ALJ hearings “provide an opportunity for appellants to 
explain the rationale for the medical treatment.”280 For many providers, the 
chance to present evidence and explain their decisions creates the 
difference between an “overpayment” and valid claim. 
ALJs are also the first instance in which a truly independent decision-
maker hears the appeal. When considering neutrality in the agency context, 
“there is wisdom in recognizing that the further the tribunal is removed 
from the agency and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the 
need for other procedural safeguards.”281 The arbiters in Reconsideration 
and Redetermination are Medicare contractors employed by CMS; their 
 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. Id.  
276. See supra Section II. 
277. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68. 
278. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 22. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 23. 
281. Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975). 
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mission includes protecting the Medicare trust funds and identifying 
potential overpayments.282 These contractors are essentially asked to judge 
a conflict where their employer is one of the parties. This creates an 
incentive adverse to the providers, who want to get paid for all of the 
services they provide. ALJs, on the other hand, are employed by a different 
agency—OMHA— and are therefore an external arbiter that is less likely to 
prioritize CMS’s interests. 
One mechanism to assess whether Reconsideration and Redeter-
mination are reliable and fair is the likelihood of a reversal before a tribunal 
that provides additional process.283 In Mathews, the Court found that ALJs 
only reverse 3.3 percent of appeals involving a person’s eligibility for 
disability benefits.284 This is in stark contrast to a provider’s likelihood of 
obtaining a reversal before an ALJ of their payment’s recoupment. CMS’s 
2014 data indicates that 54 percent of ALJ appeals fully reversed the 
underlying decision. In 2012 and 2013, ALJs overturned more than 60 
percent of underlying decisions.285 As the D.C. Circuit has stated: “if the vast 
majority of these delayed [ALJ Medicare] appeals were ultimately denied, 
they might amount to little more than an unfortunate nuisance. The record 
suggests, however, that many have merit.”286 This high reversal rate 
indicates that Reconsideration and Redetermination are not sufficiently 
protective of providers’ property interests and an additional safeguard—an 
ALJ hearing—could be warranted. 
c. The Government’s Conflicting Interest 
The final Mathews factor to consider “is the public interest. This 
includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that would be 
associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary 
hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability 
benefits.”287 In Mathews, if the Court had required the government to 
provide a pre-deprivation hearing before discontinuing disability benefits, 
it would have forced the government to continue paying disability 
beneficiaries for ten to eleven months who may have no longer been 
eligible for benefits. And because the ALJ hearing almost always found for 
 
282. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4. 
283. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319, n.29 (“As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg 
[], in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of a system of procedure, one 
must also consider the overall rate of error for all denials of benefits.” )(quoting 
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 383 n. 6 (1975)). 
284. Id. (“Here, that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these reversals 
occur at the reconsideration stage of the administrative process . . . . Netting out 
these reconsideration reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%.”). 
285. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 21-22. 
286. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 188. 
287. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42. 
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the government, those payments would have been erroneous 96.7 percent 
of the time.288 The Mathews Court relied heavily on the potential cost of 
these erroneously paid disability benefits, most of which the government 
could never recoup given the financial circumstances of the population.289 
It furthermore worried that this lost money could have been used to 
provide additional benefits to qualified individuals. This final factor was 
ultimately the reason the Court held that a pre-termination hearing was not 
required in the disability context.290 
The cost of a pre-termination hearing for Medicare providers would be 
negligible for two reasons. First, unlike disability beneficiaries who would 
have been paid monthly sums as they waited for their ALJ hearing,291 
Medicare providers are challenging a past transaction that the government 
paid for long before the appeal. In other words, a pre-deprivation hearing 
for Medicare providers would not cost the government any additional 
money given that payment had already been made.292 Second, the agency 
has a strong self-help mechanism against providers to ensure it will be paid 
back: recoupment.293 If an ALJ determines that a true overpayment has 
occurred, the agency can immediately recoup the money by ceasing all 
future Medicare payments to the provider.294 This is not a remedy available 
in the disability context, where beneficiaries are receiving government 
assistance, not payment for services rendered. Finally, given the underlying 
systemic issues that are perpetuated by these delays, it is in the public’s 
interest to create a reprieve for these small providers. 
Taken together, a court could find that the Mathews factors balance in 
favor of small Medicare providers. Because small providers are more 
severely harmed the delays than large providers and their financial risk 
more seriously impacts public interest concerns, they are best positioned 
to bring a successful due process challenge. 
d. Early Victories Suggesting that a Procedural Due Process Challenge Could Be 
Successful 
Two small providers have recently been successful at obtaining pre-
liminary relief to prevent the government from recouping their Medicare 
payments before an ALJ hearing. In Hospice Savanah, the Southern District 
of Georgia entered a temporary restraining order to prevent the 
government from recouping a small hospice provider’s Medicare payments 
 
288. Id. at n.29. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. 42 U.S.C. §1395ff(C) (2017) and MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 84, at 14. 
292. 42 U.S.C. §1395ff(D) (2017). 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
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prior to an ALJ hearing.295 The court found that the plaintiff was likely to 
succeed on the merits and be irreparably harmed if the recoupment were 
not enjoined because “Hospice Savannah will lose 80% of its total revenues 
and be . . . forced to close.”296 
In a similar case a few months later, D&G Holdings, the Western District 
of Louisiana granted a preliminary injunction preventing CMS from 
recouping overpayments before the ALJ decision:297 
[P]laintiff states that if it is not granted a timely administrative 
hearing and recoupment continues in the interim, it will lose the 
same amount of revenue, will go out of business, could not care for 
its rural customer base, and must terminate its employees . . . . These 
are damages not recompensable through retroactive payment. A 
colorable claim that irreparable harm will result has been made.298 
Both cases settled shortly after the injunctions were issued and were 
therefore not litigated fully on the merits.299 Nevertheless, both providers’ 
preliminary victories demonstrate that a due process chall-enge could be 
ultimately victorious, as the decisions were based on findings that, inter 
alia, the providers were likely to be successful on the merits. 
2.  Legal and Practical Challenges Associated with a Due Process Challenge 
Despite the possibility that a due process challenge could be successful 
and provide a unique remedy to providers, plaintiffs would need to 
overcome significant legal and practical hurdles. I explore three of the more 
pressing obstacles below. Though the legal hurdles are surmountable, the 
practical challenges will make it difficult to litigate the challenge to finality. 
a. Jurisdiction 
Providers seeking to bring a due process challenge will face a 
jurisdiction hurdle right out of the gate. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precludes federal 
jurisdiction prior to administrative exhaustion for claims “arising under” 
federal statutes, including the Medicare Act, and that base their jurisdiction 
on the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.300 Under Section 405(h), 
 
295. MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 80, at 13. 
296. Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253-JRH-GRS, 2015 WL 8488432, 
at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015). 
297. D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d. at 817. 
298. Id. at 817. 
299. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La. Apr. 
26, 2016), ECF No. 99; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell,. No. 4:15-cv-
00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 24. 
300. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2006); Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002, 1010 n.9 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Randall D. Wolcott, MD, P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 
2011). The Administrative Procedures Act does not grant jurisdiction. 
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providers are generally prohibited from bringing federal litigation to 
challenge Medicare appeals before completing all four of the System’s 
steps.301 This requirement would be quite problematic for those providers 
that risk bankruptcy while waiting for the delayed ALJ hearing. The provider 
might no longer be in business by the time it has exhausted and can litigate 
the due process claim in federal court. 
Fortunately, providers should be able to avoid this obstacle to a due 
process challenge. First, litigants challenging due process can avoid Section 
405(h) by arguing that their claim is entirely collateral to the underlying 
substantive appeal (i.e., that challenging the System’s delays is unrelated to 
whether or not the provider is entitled to payment for the underlying 
service).302 Second, the administrative appeals process may be bypassed—
and federal question jurisdiction invoked—if exhaustion would amount to 
“no review at all” of the claim.303 Providers could argue that this exception 
is met because they cannot challenge the System’s delays within the System 
itself, and they may no longer exist to challenge the delays in federal court 
if required to first exhaust. 
Both of these exceptions to Section 405(h) involve a high bar;304 
nevertheless, the D&G court allowed the plaintiff to bypass 405(h) under 
the collateral claim exception.305 The court held that a “ruling on the merits 
of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim will involve this Court in no way 
with a determination of whether Plaintiff was overpaid by Medicare, to 
 
301. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2006). 
302. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 330; see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467,482 
(1986); V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1032 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(“Eldridge suggests strongly that there is room for a wholly collateral procedural 
attack, for example, to compel agency action wrongfully withheld. In other words, 
to the extent that a provider could show that a delay during PRRB review is 
contrary to the statute, it might well have a cause of action.”) (internal citation 
omitted); Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We need 
not address whether jurisdiction is present under § 405(g), as we conclude, after 
reviewing the briefs of the parties, that the precedential authority of this circuit 
establishes that the judgment of the district court, even if not “final” per se, is 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine . . . ”); St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross 
Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 291 (8th Cir. 1976). 
303. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 19 (2000) (“[The Medicare 
Act] does not apply § 405(h) where application of § 405(h) would not simply 
channel review through the agency, but would mean no review at all.”); BP Care 
v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 508 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Put another way, “parties 
affected by Medicare administrative determinations may sue in federal court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, bypassing § 405 preclusion, only where requiring agency 
review pursuant to § 405(h) would mean no review at all.”). 
304. See e.g., Triple a Home Care Agency v. Burwell, No. 4:15CV668 JCH, 2016 WL 
728334, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2016) (holding that plaintiff provide could not 
meet the collateral claim doctrine because it sought review of the underlying 
overpayment determination, which was not “collateral.”). 
305. D&G Holdings, 812 F. Supp. 3d. at 798. 
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what degree any overpayment was made, or the suitability of the statistical 
extrapolation used to assess Plaintiff’s alleged overpayment.”306 The court, 
however, was unpersuaded by the “no review at all” exception, holding that 
the exception required a showing of legal impossibility, which the plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate.307 
b. Property Interest 
Assuming the court finds jurisdiction, plaintiffs will also face negative 
precedent in proving that a potential overpayment constitutes a 
constitutionally recognized property interest.308 Providers have historically 
been unsuccessful in lodging due process claims against the government.309 
In particular, courts have not been willing to find a property interest in 
future Medicaid or Medicare payments that are recouped, frozen, or 
withheld based on findings of potential Medicare fraud.310 No court, 
however, has examined whether the government’s recoupment of 
previously distributed Medicare payments based not on fraud, but a 
potential overpayment constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of 
property. Though not an easy question, I contend that once the government 
transfers possession of the payment to the provider, the property interest 
in the payment shifts from the government to the provider. 
 
306. Id. at 815. 
307. Id. Arguably, exhaustion could involve a legal impossibility: by the time a provider 
reaches federal court after exhausting the four steps in the System, it no longer 
has standing to challenge the delays because it is no longer being affected by 
them. 
308. Providers could also attempt to prove that a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest is at stake when the government threatens providers’ ability to continue 
their chosen profession. Mary Squire proposed that a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest can be implicated when a Medicare provider faces bankruptcy as 
a result of agency action. Squire, supra note 213, at 240-42. However, this theory 
is even less supported. The fact that providers have a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest to pursue their chosen profession does not mean that government 
action threatening their ability to stay in business impinges on that interest, see 
James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and 
Policy Analysis, 59 TEX L. REV. 1345, 1390-91 (1981). 
309. See e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1975); Karnak Educ. 
Trust v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 1517, 1519-20 (11th Cir. 1987). 
310. ABA v. D.C., 40 F. Supp. 3d 153, 167 (D.D.C. 2014) (“In contrast to a provider’s right 
to participate in the Medicaid program, there is no constitutional right to receive 
Medicaid payments.”); Personal Care Products v. Hawkins, 635 F.3d 155, 159 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (“Nothing in Texas or federal law extends a property right in Medicaid 
reimbursements to a provider that is the subject of a fraud investigation.”); 
Clarinda Home Health v. Shalala, 100 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 1996) (“we hold that 
it is not a violation of due process to temporarily withhold Medicare payments 
during an ongoing investigation for acts of fraud.”); Chaves County Home Health 
Service v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Yorktown Med. Lab. v. 
Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1991).. 
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The Medicare statute clearly creates a right to payment, but the 
question is whether that right is dependent on the claim successfully 
passing through post-payment review.311 The statute and regulations 
governing overpayments complicate the issue because they create 
procedures by which the government can recoup payments that it has 
already made.312 Those procedures, however, do not necessarily define the 
property interest—if they did, then the legislature (as opposed to the 
Constitution) would be designating the scope of due process. The Supreme 
Court has found this impermissible.313 The legislature creates property 
interests, but federal courts define the scope of the Consti-tution’s due 
process protection.314 The Supreme Court described this distinction in 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill by stating: “the categories of substance 
and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be 
reduced to a mere tautology. ‘Property’ cannot be defined by the 
procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.”315 
The Loudermill court explicitly rejected Justice Rehnquist’s view in Arnett v. 
Kennedy316 that when a legislature grants a substantive right, plaintiffs must 
accept the limitations placed upon it.317 Thus, the fact that the government 
can review and recoup Medicare payments after they are made to 
providers does not mean that the property interest does not vest at the 
time of payment. 
 
311. 42 U.S.C. 1395g(a) (2010) (“the Secretary shall periodically determine the amount 
which should be paid under this part to each provider of services with respect to 
the services furnished by it, and the provider of services shall be paid, at such time 
or times as the Secretary believes appropriate (but not less often than 
monthly) . . . .”) (emphasis added). The statute creates prepayment conditions 
before payment is made, not post-payment conditions see 42 U.S. Code § 1395f. 
(2010). 
312. The statute and provider agreements are not silent about overpayments. The 
statute permits “necessary adjustments on account of previously made 
overpayments or underpayments.” 42 U.S.C.§1395g(a) (2010). The right to collect 
overpayments is also provided in the agreement signed when providers apply to 
become a Medicare provider. One provision requires providers to agree that “any 
existing or future overpayment made to the provider by the Medicare program 
may be recouped by Medicare through the withholding of future payments.” CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ENROLLMENT APPLICATION 48 (2011), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMS-
Forms/downloads/cms855a.pdf. 
313. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
314. See id. 
315. Id. 
316. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-154 (1974) (“where the grant of a 
substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures 
which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of 
appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.”). 
317. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. 
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Linking a provider’s property interest in Medicare payments with the 
transfer of property is a plausible interpretation of the Medicare statute.318 
And once the property interest has been created, only the courts can decide 
under what circumstances that interest can be deprived. Under this theory, 
the government could still recoup previously distributed Medicare 
payments, but only after first providing sufficient process: an ALJ hearing. 
c. Practical Implications 
A final hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome to achieve a victory on the 
merits of a due process challenge is to avoid the pressure to settle. The 
plaintiffs in both D&G and Hospice Savannah settled their lawsuits as soon 
as they earned preliminary relief.319 CMS was motivated to settle so that it 
could avoid thhe possibility of negative precedent on the merits that would 
force it to delay recoupment for all providers. The plaintiffs, facing 
insolvency and anxious to reduce the burden of recoupment, were not in a 
financial position to reject a favorable settlement and continue their 
lawsuit. Of course, it is the very fact that small providers face the threat of 
bankruptcy that makes their due process claim possible—the interest 
affected is severe enough to tilt the Mathews balance in their favor. CMS 
can use this reality to its benefit by essentially buying out successful 
plaintiffs before the merits are reached. 
AHA did not face this same financial pressure and was able to endure 
years of litigation before ultimately winning a writ of man-damus. It was 
also not suing as an individual provider hoping to win a good result for itself, 
but as an organization using an impact litigation strategy to win a good 
result for its members. The AHA lawsuit represented a unique case in which 
private parties were able to use litigation to pressure a reluctant agency to 
act. A similar outcome based on a due process remedy is possible, so long 
as a plaintiff can resist the pressure to settle. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Medicare Appeals System is broken. It cannot accommodate the 
influx of appeals that are entitled to ALJ review. Despite the government’s 
failure to meet its statutory deadlines, CMS continues to recoup payments 
on schedule as if the delays are not occurring. This places an extreme 
burden on providers, whose Medicare payments are recouped while they 
 
318. This interpretation also has some support in recent case law see ABA, 40 F.Supp.3d 
at 167 (distinguishing itself from Chaves County Home Health Service, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 1991) on the grounds that the Chavez 
plaintiffs “asserted the right to retain payments already made, circumstances 
entirely different than those presented here,” noting that “providers had a 
property interest in the monies they had received.”). 
319. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La. 
Apr. 26, 2016), ECF No. 99; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-
cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 24. 
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wait years for ALJ hearing, which is more likely than not to determine that 
the recoupment was erroneous. Small providers in particular cannot 
accommodate the years-long deprivation of their recouped Medicare 
payments. Legislative and regulatory solutions have failed thus far. 
Litigation appears to be the only source of imminent progress for providers. 
Though providers were initially able to obtain a writ of mandamus, a 
successful due process challenge would better protect small providers, who 
may be otherwise forced to face insolvency, sell their businesses to larger 
companies, opt out of Medicare, or cut patient services to avoid the 
financial strain associated with the delays. 
The ultimate solution to the backlog requires congressional action. 
Congress must decide to fund additional ALJs to accommodate the influx of 
appeals or alter the pipeline of appeals entering the System. At this point, 
Congress seems unmotivated to do either. Litigation is particularly 
promising because it exerts pressure on the government to enact lasting 
reforms. However, if the current legal remedy—mandamus—remains in 
effect, it will perpetuate the disproportionate burdens small providers 
experience and therefore fail to help the most vulnerable victims of the 
System’s delays. Though the agency has rulemaking authority to relieve 
some of the pressure on small providers by delaying recoupment, it has 
been unwilling to do so. A due process challenge would force the 
government to implement this change, but the litigating plaintiff must first 
overcome numerous legal and practical obstacles. It might, however, be 
small providers’ best chance at ob-taining relief while they wait for 
Congress to act. 
 
